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THE FLORIDA BEACH CASE AND THE ROAD TO
JUDICIAL TAKINGS
MICHAEL C. BLUMM* & ELIZABETH B. DAWSON**
ABSTRACT
In Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Department of Environ-
mental Protection, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously upheld a state
beach restoration project against landowner claims of an unconstitutional
taking of the property. This result was not nearly as surprising as the
fact that the Court granted certiorari on a case that turned on an obscure
aspect of Florida property law: whether landowners adjacent to a beach
had the rights to future accretions of sand and to maintain contact with
the water.
The Court’s curious interest in the case was piqued by the land-
owners’ recasting the case from the regulatory taking claim they unsuc-
cessfully pursued in the Florida courts to the judicial taking claim they
argued before the Supreme Court. The petitioners contended that the
Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of Florida property law warranted
constitutional compensation because the effect was to replace an eroded,
hurricane-ravaged private beach with a restored, publicly-accessible beach.
Although no member of the Court agreed that the lower court’s opinion
amounted to a taking, a four-member plurality, led by Justice Scalia and
encouraged by numerous amicus briefs filed by libertarian property groups,
gave a ringing endorsement to the concept of judicial takings. Moreover,
two other members of the Court, Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor, claimed
that state court property law interpretations could be cabined by the Due
Process Clause. The result portends ominous implications for state courts’
capability to perform their traditional common law function of updating
property law to reflect contemporary values and may unsettle federal-
state judicial relations by encouraging litigants to appeal adverse state
property law decisions to federal courts.
* Jeffrey Bain Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School.
** J.D. and Certificate in Environmental and Natural Resources Law, Lewis and Clark Law
School, expected 2011; B.A. Spanish, B.F.A. Music Theater, Viterbo University, 2005.
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INTRODUCTION
Five years into its tenure, the Roberts Court has shown little of
the restraint its Chief Justice espoused in his confirmation hearings.1 As
one commentator observed, “judicial minimalism is gone, and the court has
entered an assertive and sometimes unpredictable phase.”2 Even former
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor quipped, “I step away for
a couple of years and there’s no telling what’s going to happen.”3 From
striking down programs promoting racial diversity,4 to restricting local
governments’ ability to regulate guns,5 to giving corporations the right
to speak with their money in political election campaigns,6 the Roberts
Court has issued a startling array of opinions reversing longstanding
decisions. During the 2009 Term, the Court brought its activism to bear
on two improbable candidates: Florida’s sand beaches and the concept of
judicial takings.
Due to hurricanes, tropical storms, and other, slower-moving erosive
forces, many of Florida’s beaches are in peril.7 To remedy this problem,
1 Jeffrey Toobin, Activism v. Restraint, THE NEW YORKER, May 24, 2010, http://www.new
yorker.com/talk/comment/2010/05/24/100524taco_talk_toobin (“Roberts and his allies . . .
profess to believe in judicial restraint . . . and respect for precedent, but their actions belie
their supposed values.”). In his confirmation hearings, Chief Justice Roberts spoke of the
judge’s duty to “have the self-restraint to recognize that [the judge’s] role is limited to inter-
preting the law and does not include making the law.” Transcript: Day Two of the Roberts
Confirmation Hearings (Part VI: Sens. Graham and Schumer), WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/13/AR2005091301838
.html. On another day of the hearings, he reiterated that “judicial self-restraint is the key
check on the authority of the court.” Transcript: Day Three of the Roberts Confirmation
Hearings (Morning Session: Sens. Brownback and Coburn), WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/14/AR2005091401445.html.
2 Adam Liptak, News Analysis; Roberts Court Comes of Age, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2010, at
A19, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9406E7DF163CF933
A05755C0A9669D8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=1.
3 See Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decades, N.Y. TIMES,
July 24, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/us/25roberts.html
?_r=1&scp=1&sq=conservative%20roberts%20court&st=cse.
4 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (rejecting
the schools’ diversity programs as illegitimate racial balancing).
5 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (incorporating the Second Amend-
ment right to keep and bear arms against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment);
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognizing an individual right to bear
arms under the Second Amendment).
6 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (prohibiting the govern-
ment from restricting political speech on the basis of corporate status).
7 See TIMOTHY BEATLEY et al., COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT 117 (Island Press 2d ed. 2002).
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nearly four decades ago the legislature enacted a statute authorizing the
state to restore the beaches, so long as the new beach belongs to the state.8
The state’s claim to ownership of the restored beaches caught the ire of
some beachfront property owners when the state sought to restore the
beach in front of their homes, prompting them to sue the state, alleging
a taking of their property.9 Although the Florida Supreme Court upheld
the legislation against their claims,10 the landowners recharacterized
their argument to successfully pique the interest of four Supreme Court
Justices—alleging that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision upholding the
state’s action itself effected the taking: in other words, a judicial taking.11
The judicial takings doctrine assumes that the Fifth Amendment’s
Takings Clause can be applied to the judiciary, not just the legislative and
executive branches, as has been the historical practice.12 The concept is
not entirely foreign to American law, but until the Roberts Court, it had
largely remained the subject of scholarly articles.13 Although some dicta
in case law as far back as the late nineteenth century had suggested the
notion,14 the cases were always decided on other grounds.15 But in 2010,
the U.S. Supreme Court confronted the judicial takings doctrine and nearly
endorsed it. In the Florida beach case, the Court could not agree on what
exactly a judicial taking would look like, if indeed it occurred,16 and some
Justices thought the Court should not have spoken on the issue at all.17
8 See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 161.011-.25, 161.141-.161(5), 253.12 (2010).
9 See Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (SOB I), Case Nos. 04-2960,
04-3261, at 13 (Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. June 30, 2005) (recommended order), available
at http://www.dep.state.fl.us/legal/Final_Orders/2005/DEP05-0791.pdf.
10 See id.
11 See Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2008);
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16; Motion for Leave to File Brief of Pacific Legal Found-
ation as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Petitioner at 1, Stop the Beach Renourishment v.
Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (No. 08-1151).
12 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601
(2010).
13 See, e.g., David J. Benderman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and
Judicial Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375 (1996); David Sarratt, Judicial Takings and
the Course Pursued, 90 VA. L. REV. 1487 (2004).
14 See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 234–36,
244–46, discussed infra notes 156-67 and accompanying text.
15 See, e.g., id. at 258 (1897) (upholding a jury award of just compensation to the railroad
for its loss of a right of way over its tracks).
16 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2603–07; id. at 2618–19 (Kennedy, J.
concurring).
17 Id. at 2618 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 2613 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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The result was a plurality opinion whose influence may exceed its prece-
dential value, possibly serving to stifle the evolution of state property law
in the process.
This Article maintains that the latest example of the Roberts
Court’s activism departs considerably from the Court’s prior deference to
the state courts’ primary role in articulating state property law, and that
the result could portend significant ramifications. Part I describes the pre-
carious situation of Florida’s beaches and explains the state’s response
to beach erosion. Part II examines the litigation in the lower courts that
led the Supreme Court to grant certiorari. Part III takes a step back to
look at the concept of judicial takings and examines how that doctrine
may have influenced the Court’s decision in the Florida case. Part IV dis-
cusses the Court’s Florida beach decision, including the plurality and
concurring opinions. Part V assesses the implications of the Court’s
decision, both in terms of its immediate effects and its long-term legacy.
The Article concludes that the plurality opinion, should the Court adopt
it, would be a radical departure from judicial restraint and from the
original meaning of the Takings Clause, imposing an obstacle to state
courts’ ability to adapt state property law to changing circumstances
without second-guessing from federal courts.
I. FLORIDA’S BEACHES
When most people think about Florida, its beaches are among the
first characteristics that come to mind. Although recent events, like the
Deepwater Horizon oil rig disaster in the Gulf of Mexico,18 have high-
lighted the vulnerability of coastal ecosystems,19 Florida’s beaches have
long experienced changing fortunes. This section explains the precarious
nature of Florida’s beaches in some detail and the state’s response to that
vulnerability.
A. Coastal Restoration in Florida
Before examining Florida’s beach restoration scheme, some back-
ground on beach restoration is in order. This foundation will supply an
18 See Deepwater Horizon Response and Restoration, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, http://
interior.gov/deepwaterhorizon/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
19 See generally Emergency Authorization for Protective Measures, Restoration, and Certain
Other Measures Made Necessary by the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, OGC No. 10-1610,
(Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. June 18, 2010) (second amended final order), available at http://
www.dep.state.fl.us/beaches/publications/pdf/emergency/DEP2ndAmndEFO6-18-10.pdf
(providing guidance as to how to protect public safety and wildlife resources).
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understanding of the evolution of Florida’s legislation and explain why
coastal restoration has become such a contentious issue.
1. An Introduction to Beach Nourishment
Coastal dwellers understand the ongoing push and pull of the sea,
usually limited to the routine changes of the tides.20 Occasionally, however,
major events like tropical storms and hurricanes alter the shoreline drasti-
cally.21 Of course, gradual, natural erosion occurs in places as well.22 Taken
together, coastal erosion could destroy one out of every four houses within
500 feet of the U.S. shoreline by 2060, according to one estimate.23 In all, as
much as one-fourth of the coast may be eroding.24 In response, governments
undertake beach restoration, an arguably effective, but unquestionably
temporary, solution to the continual battle against coastal erosion.25
Beach restoration often occurs through a process called “nourish-
ment” (used interchangeably with “renourishment”), in which sand is
dredged from the ocean floor, mixed with water, and then piped onto an
eroded beach.26 The water then drains away, leaving the sand behind.27
Some questions exist as to the environmental viability, or even necessity,
of this process. Opponents of nourishment argue that, unless replacement
sand matches the qualities of the existing sand, projects can interfere with
the animal life using the beach.28 Not only do critics worry about the beach,
they also question the effects of the dredging process on the ocean floor.29
Moreover, because by their very nature beaches erode, any restoration
20 See BEATLEY, supra note 7, at 33.
21 Id. at 72–73.
22 Id. at 73, 117.
23 Id. at 117.
24 See JOSEPH J. KALO ET AL., COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW 303 (2007).
25 See BEATLEY, supra note 7, at 72–74, 118.
26 See Cornelia Dean, Surfers Deal a Blow to a Beach Dredging Project, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9,
2009, at A11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/09/science/earth/09surfers.html.
27 See id. (describing a failed attempt to repair a section of Palm Beach). Replacement sand
can also bring with it extra material that is sometimes dangerous. For example, sand from
a beach renourishment project in New Jersey contained an unexploded bomb fuse dating
from World War II, which a father and his children mistakenly took for a pin from an old
ship. See Chris Dixon, Re-engineering America’s Beaches, 1 Tax Dollar at a Time, POPULAR
MECHANICS, Oct. 1, 2009, http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/environment/4217981.
28 See Dean, supra note 26.
29 See id.
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project will have to be continually replenished, sometimes earlier than
engineering estimates predict.30 Over the course of a decade, maintain-
ing a beach may cost up to $6 million a mile.31 More fundamentally, some
critics contend that the need to restore beaches is a problem only to the
extent that landowners continue to build close to the shoreline, interfering
with the ecosystem’s natural process of shoreline change.32
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the federal agency most in-
volved in beach nourishments, counters that nourishment projects create
habitat for endangered animals residing on the beach, like sea turtles
and piping plovers.33 Although acknowledging short-term detriment to
some organisms, the Corps believes that “sound management practices”
can alleviate these adverse effects.34 Additionally, when the federal gov-
ernment funds a renourishment project, the new land becomes public
land and subject to the Corps’ public access policies.35 The federal shore
protection program, authorized initially under the Rivers and Harbors
Act36 and currently funded through the Water Resources Development
30 Id.; BEATLEY, supra note 7, at 73. “[R]ecent studies of beach renourishment projects sug-
gest that the practice is very expensive and short-lived. The length of time before additional
renourishing is necessary has been consistently overestimated (especially by the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers . . .).” Id. For example, a 1982 project in Ocean City, New Jersey, costing
$5.2 million, lasted 2.5 months. Id. at 118.
31 BEATLEY, supra note 7, at 74.
32 See Orrin H. Pilkey & Andy Coburn, Beach Nourishment: Is It Worth The Cost?—
Perspective, COASTAL SERV. CTR., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://www.csc
.noaa.gov/beachnourishment/html/human/dialog/series1a.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
33 DENNIS P. ROBINSON, LAURA ZEPP & HARRY M. SHOUDY, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS,
THE DISTRIBUTION OF SHORE PROTECTION BENEFITS: A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION viii
(Draft 2001) [hereinafter ROBINSON], available at http://www.saw.usace.army.mil/coastal/
ShoreProtectionBenefits_Part1.pdf.
34 Id.
35 BEATLEY, supra note 7, at 148. See also U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, ER 1165-2-
130, WATER RESOURCES POLICIES AND AUTHORITIES: FEDERAL PARTICIPATION IN SHORE
PROTECTION (6)(h)(3) (1989), available at http://140.194.76.129/publications/eng-regs/
er1165-2-130/entire.pdf (“Reasonable public access must be provided in accordance with
the recreational use objectives of the particular area.”); U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS,
SHORE PROTECTION ASSESSMENT, HOW BEACH NOURISHMENT PROJECTS WORK 9 (2007),
available at http://chl.erdc.usace.army.mil//Media/7/4/7/HowBeachNourishmentWorks.pdf
(specifying that projects with “federal involvement . . . must be accessible to the public”).
33 C.F.R. § 209.315(c) (2009) (providing for public access to all “navigation works of general
public interest” that do not present hazards or where public access would not interfere with
the site’s operations).
36 ROBINSON, supra note 33, at 5; Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899 (“RHA”),
33 U.S.C. §§ 401–467n (2006). Specifically, in 1930, Congress amended the RHA to include 
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Act,37 has cost the government around $100 million a year as recently
as 2001.38
Despite questions about the efficacy of beach nourishment, all
coastal states bordering the Atlantic Ocean, the Pacific Ocean, and the Gulf
of Mexico have undertaken beach nourishment projects of some kind.39
Even some Great Lakes states have restored portions of their beaches.40
Wealthy and coastally dependent cities, such as Virginia Beach, Virginia,
and Ocean City, Maryland, have invested heavily in such projects, reflect-
ing their attractiveness when significant property investments are at
stake.41 By 1996, governments had undertaken some 418 beach restora-
tion projects, with a total of 1448 individual sand placements, costing $3.4
billion (in 1996 dollars).42 Between 2000 and 2009, beach nourishment
projects placed the equivalent of $1.1 billion in dredge material on the
country’s shores, with forty-eight projects beginning in 2006 alone.43 Beach
nourishment has thus become a popular middle ground between build-
ing physical structures to keep erosion at bay and succumbing to coastal
section 426, which authorizes the Secretary of the Army to study the necessity of erosion
control. Id. § 426; Pub. L. No. 71-520, § 2, 46 Stat. 945 (1930).
37 Water Resources Development Act of 1986 (“WRDA”), 33 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2339 (2006).
In the view of the Corps, the WRDA shifted the permissible purpose of federally-funded
projects from beach erosion control to hurricane and storm damage reduction but allowed
beach erosion costs to be included as appropriate. ROBINSON, supra note 33, at ix; 33
U.S.C. § 2213(d).
38 ROBINSON, supra note 33, at 16.
39 See Arthur C. Trembanis, Orrin H. Pilkey & Hugo R. Valverde, Comparison of Beach
Nourishment Along the U.S. Atlantic, Great Lakes, Gulf of Mexico, and New England
Shorelines, 27 COASTAL MGMT. 329, 330–32 (1999), available at http://www.wcu.edu/
WebFiles/PDFs/psds_Comparison_Nourishment_1999.pdf. In fact, nearly all the Los
Angeles County beaches are artificial, made of dredged sand. CORNELIA DEAN, AGAINST
THE TIDE: THE BATTLE FOR AMERICA’S BEACHES 99 (1999).
40 Trembanis, Pilkey & Valverde, supra note 39, at 330. All told, at least twenty-three states
have undertaken, are planning, or are constructing shore restoration projects that include
beach nourishment: Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut,
New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, California, Washington, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and Indiana. Id. at 331–32; Program for the Study of Developed Shorelines,
Beach Nourishment, W. CAROLINA U., http://www.wcu.edu/1038.asp (last visited Feb. 10,
2011); THEODORE M. HILLYER, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS
AND SHORE PROTECTION 66 (2003), available at http://www.nationalshorelinemanagement
.us/docs/National_Shoreline_Study_IWR03-NSMS-1.pdf.
41 See BEATLEY, supra note 7, at 73.
42 See Trembanis, Pilkey & Valverde, supra note 39, at 332 tbl.1.
43 See Dixon, supra note 27.
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retreat.44 With climate change promising rising sea levels,45 increased
pressure for beach nourishment seems inevitable.
2. Florida’s Beach and Shore Preservation Act
The state of Florida possesses the longest stretch of coastline of
any of the lower contiguous states46—some 825 miles.47 Its coastline fea-
tures predominantly sandy beaches, which are major tourist attractions,48
but these beaches are also prone to erosion.49 Consequently, the state is
uniquely vulnerable, both economically and ecologically, to hurricanes and
tropical storms. Responding to this vulnerability, in 1961 the Florida
legislature enacted the Beach and Shore Preservation Act (“BSPA”),50
declaring a “necessary governmental responsibility” to 1) protect such
beaches from erosion and 2) restore those beaches already eroded.51 The
BSPA gave the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”)
responsibility to administrate the program,52 but the statute also made
county commissioners the “beach and shore preservation authority” within
each county.53
To comply with its responsibilities under the BSPA, the DEP
first issued a report of the condition of the state’s coastline in 1989,
identifying 217.6 miles of critically-eroded beaches.54 By June 2010, the
amount of critically-eroded beaches rose steadily to 398.6 miles, despite
44 BEATLEY, supra note 7, at 72.
45 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency stated that the confluence of climate-induced
sea level rise and storm damage poses a particular threat to Florida. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, SAVING FLORIDA’S VANISHING SHORES (2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/
climatechange/effects/coastal/saving_FL.pdf.
46 FLA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., 1994 FLORIDA SEDIMENT QUALITY ASSESSMENT GUIDELINES
6 (1998), available at http://www.dep.state.fl.us/waste/quick_topics/publications/documents/
sediment/volume1/chapter2.pdf.
47 FLA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., STRATEGIC BEACH MANAGEMENT PLAN 1 (2008) [hereinafter
MAY 2008 SBMP], available at http://www.dep.state.fl.us/beaches/publications/pdf/SBMP/
Cover%20and%20Introduction.pdf.
48 Id.
49 FLA. STAT. § 161.088 (2010).
50 Id. § 161.011; see also id. § 161.088.
51 Id. § 161.088.
52 Id. § 161.031.
53 Id. § 161.25.
54 BUREAU OF BEACHES & COASTAL SYS., FLA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., CRITICALLY ERODED
BEACHES IN FLORIDA 1 (2010) [hereinafter CRITICALLY ERODED BEACHES IN FLORIDA],
available at http://www.dep.state.fl.us/beaches/publications/pdf/CritEroRpt07-10.pdf.
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renourishment of several areas.55 Currently, over 485 miles of the
state’s beaches—fifty-nine percent in 2010—are experiencing some type
of erosion.56
Once the DEP lists a beach as critically-eroded, the beach be-
comes eligible to receive state funding for beach management.57 In 2008,
197.8 of those critically-eroded miles were under “active management,”
which includes restoration, nourishment, and other mitigation efforts.58
Since its enactment, Florida’s beach erosion control program has helped
restore over 200 miles of the state’s beaches.59 Through fiscal year 2006,
the state legislature allocated over $582 million for beach restoration and
hurricane recovery.60
As might be imagined, beach restoration projects often affect
private property. One of the most important preliminary steps in carry-
ing out a beach restoration project is to determine where private property
ends and public property begins.61 The Board of Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Fund (“Board of Trustees” or “Board”) is the trustee of all
Florida submerged tidal lands, holding them in trust for the benefit of the
people of the state.62 The Board is the ultimate authority with respect to
setting tidal property lines.63
The Board first attempts to define the pre-erosion mean high water
line (“MHWL”),64 a shifting boundary that has traditionally served as the
demarcation between private and public property in Florida.65 Second,
using the MHWL as a guide, the Board establishes a permanent “Erosion
Control Line” (“ECL”) to prospectively divide public and private property.66
After setting the ECL, all seaward land belongs to the state.67 Because
55 See id. at 3.
56 Beach Erosion Control Program, FLA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., http://www.dep.state.fl
.us/beaches/programs/bcherosn.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
57 MAY 2008 SBMP, supra note 47, at 1–2.
58 Id. at 2.
59 FLA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., supra note 56.
60 Id.
61 See FLA. STAT. § 161.141 (2010).
62 Id. § 253.12.
63 Id. § 161.161(5).
64 Id.
65 Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., 512 So.2d 934,
940 (Fla. 1987). This line is based on the nineteen-year average height of the high tide.
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 18-21.003(37) (2010).
66 FLA. STAT. § 161.161(3)–(5).
67 Id. § 161.191(1).
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the public owns land seaward of the ECL,68 upland owners may no longer
have constant contact with the water, losing the right to future accretions
as a result.69 But, in exchange, landowners obtain the protection of the
state against future beach erosion.70
If the ECL does not accurately reflect the pre-erosion MHWL, but
instead encroaches upon riparian land, Florida law requires condemnation
proceedings to compensate riparian owners.71 Ordinarily, the Board of
Trustees’ regulations require governmental entities to show “sufficient
upland interest” to conduct projects on sovereign submerged lands.72
However, in the case of beach restoration, sufficient governmental
upland ownership need not be shown, so long as the restoration does not
“unreasonably infringe upon riparian rights.”73 Finally, once the beach
has been restored,74 if the entity responsible for the project fails to
maintain the ECL, the upland owner’s rights revert to the pre-project
status quo.75
At first glance, this program seems unlikely to upset beachfront
property owners, given its inherent benefits to the landowners’ property.
Indeed, according to the federal National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin-
istration, “[o]wners of beachfront property and businesses that depend on
beaches . . . demand shore protection or beach renourishment.”76 From 1961
68 Id.
69 Under Florida law, accretion is the “gradual and imperceptible accumulation of land
along the shore or bank of a body of water.” Sand Key, 512 So. 2d at 936 (citations omitted).
Reliction, conversely, occurs when water recedes gradually and imperceptibly, revealing
new land. Id. In contrast with these gradual changes, when a sudden change occurs, that
is an avulsion, whether the cause is an addition of new land or a receding of water. Id.
See generally 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, § 6.03(b)(2) (Robert E. Beck & Amy K. Kelley,
eds. LexisNexis/Matthew Bender, 3d ed. 2009) (discussing the difference between accretion,
reliction, and avulsion, and the legal implications of each).
70 See FLA. STAT. § 161.191(2) (2010).
71 See id. § 161.141.
72 FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 18-21.004(3)(b) (2010). The regulations define “satisfactory evidence
of sufficient upland interest” to require documentary proof of a property interest in the
riparian land, for example, an easement or a lease. Id. r. 18-21.003(60).
73 Id. r. 18-21.004(3).
74 Although beach restoration can take several forms, the DEP prefers nourishment. FLA.
DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., supra note 56. A benefit of this method, according to the DEP, is
a quick restoration of habitat for shorebirds and marine turtles. Id.
75 See FLA. STAT. § 161.211(2).
76 Beach Nourishment: A Guide for Local Government Officials, Social and Demographic
Trends that Affect the Need for Beach Nourishment, COASTAL SERV. CTR., NAT’L OCEANIC
AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (“NOAA”), http://www.csc.noaa.gov/beachnourishment/html/
human/socio/change.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2011). These projects undoubtedly also
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to 2003, no one challenged the validity of the BSPA as it applied to these
projects.77 For example, Delray Beach, in Palm Beach County on Florida’s
Atlantic coast, has been renourished consistently since the 1970s.78
B. The Destin Beach: From Sugary Sand to Critical Erosion
The city of Destin, Florida, has been described as “the world’s
luckiest fishing village.”79 Between the late 1970s, when Destin was still
a town of just 2000 permanent residents, and today, an influx of beach-
goers and developers descended, transforming the fishing village into a
tourist mecca. Newcomers found pristine sand and sparkling water, took
advantage of the lack of development, and built a virtual playground on
the beach. Some longtime Destin residents were skeptical about this boom,
however, especially when developers built on newly-accreted land that
history showed could disappear much faster than it arrived. The skeptics
were right. In 1995, Hurricane Opal ravaged Destin’s beaches, destroying
dunes and changing tidal patterns, beginning a decade of further erosion.
To remedy the situation, the city turned to the state government and its
erosion control program. Ordinarily, the renourishment program is a
popular way to protect both the state’s tourism industry and the coastal
ecosystem.80 But Destin proved to be different.
Destin beachfront property owners and tourists have long been at
odds; the property owners fight to keep tourists from leaving the wet sand
have an effect on the tax base. With a more stable shoreline, not only do property values
increase and property tax revenues rise, but tourist activity also increases, providing a
source of funds for the continued maintenance and renourishment. See Beach Nourishment:
A Guide for Local Government Officials, Impact of Beach Nourishment on the Tax Base and
Associated Revenues, NOAA, http://www.csc.noaa.gov/beachnourishment/html/human/
socio/taxbase.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2011). In states like Florida that have a cap on
property taxes, however, that source of revenue may plateau. See id.
77 Searches for citing references to the BSPA in both Westlaw and LexisNexis reveal sev-
eral previous cases applying the BSPA to specific circumstances, but none assessing its
validity until the current dispute. For more on the popular acceptance of beach restoration,
see BEATLEY, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
78 DEAN, supra note 39, at 99.
79 Andrew Rice, A Stake in the Sand, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2010, at MM66 (Sunday
Magazine), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/21/realestate/keymagazine/
21KeyBeachfront-t.html. The following three paragraphs are derived from Rice’s article,
except where otherwise noted.
80 See Virginia Smith, Sand & Dollars, DAYTONA BEACH NEWS-JOURNAL (Nov. 14, 2004),
http://www.news-journalonline.com/special/beacherosion/111404.htm (describing the eco-
nomic success of the Miami Beach nourishment project and other cities’ subsequent rush
to imitate it).
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between the high and low tides, which belongs to the public as part of
Florida’s public trust, and encroaching on their dry sand. For their part,
the tourists and beachgoers claimed an inherent right to enjoy the beach.
The property owners’ attempt to settle the dispute coincided with the city’s
initiation of its beach restoration project. Some of the property owners
challenged the Destin ECL that the Board of Trustees set under the BSPA
prior to beginning the restoration process, claiming a violation of their
constitutional property rights. They formed an organization, Save Our
Beaches (“SOB”), to challenge the project in court.81
Further down the coast, beachfront landowners who had experi-
enced erosion to a greater extent than Destin and who had been clamoring
for restoration for years expressed astonishment that a group like SOB
was fighting the project. Still others thought that humans should retreat
from the coast altogether and let nature take its course. Nevertheless,
SOB proceeded with its lawsuit.
II. THE DESTIN BEACH CASE
Winding its way through Florida’s administrative and judicial
systems, Save Our Beaches proposed several different theories in differ-
ent forums, picking up additional plaintiffs (and eventually being forced
out of the suit) along the way.82 The case that eventually reached the
United States Supreme Court in 2009 hardly resembled the relatively
simple permit challenge that began in 2004.83 Nevertheless, understand-
ing where the case came from allows a full appreciation of the context of
the case that the Supreme Court ultimately decided.
A. The DEP’s Draft Permit
On July 30, 2003, the city of Destin (in Okaloosa County), in a joint
effort with neighboring Walton County, submitted an application to the
DEP for a permit to use coastal submerged lands to restore 6.9 miles of
81 Eventually, the group grew to about 150 members. See Gary K. Oldehoff, Florida’s Beach
Restoration Program Weathers a Storm in the Courts: Stop the Beach Renourishment v.
Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 84 FLA. BAR J. 10 (2010), available at
http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNJournal01.nsf/8c9f13012b96736985256aa
900624829/80b1e04e426a3a9c852577c9005539ce!OpenDocument; see SOB I, supra note 9,
at 13.
82 Id.
83 See SOB I, supra note 9, at 13; Rice, supra note 79.
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beach and to conduct dune restoration.84 Nearly a year later, on July 15,
2004, the DEP issued a notice of intent to issue a permit,85 a draft final
permit,86 and a final notice to inform the public of the permit’s issuance
and the availability of an administrative appeal.87 The DEP described
the purpose of the project as a response to severe erosion of recreational
beaches caused by Hurricanes Erin, Opal, and Georges, and Tropical
Storm Isidore.88 In the notice the DEP also indicated that the applicants
(Destin and Walton County) would have to work with the Florida Fish and
Wildlife Conservation Commission (“FWC”) to take precautions to mini-
mize adverse effects to nesting turtles and shorebirds.89 Nevertheless,
the DEP did not expect the project to significantly adversely affect water
quality, nesting sea turtles, beach quality, or public use of the beach (except
during construction).90 In addition, the DEP determined the project was
in the public interest.91
The DEP also made the requisite finding that the project would not
interfere with the riparian rights of those who owned property adjacent
84 Application for Permit/Water Quality Certification, and Authorization to Use Sovereign
Submerged Lands, 0218419-001-JC, (Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. July 15, 2004) (Notice of
Intent to Issue Permit) [hereinafter Notice of Intent], available at http://bcs.dep.state.fl
.us/env-prmt/walton/issued/0218419_Walton_County%20(Feasibility%20Study,
%20Taylor%20Engineering,%202003)/001-JC/Intent%20to%20Issue%20(07-15-04)/Final
%20Intent%20to%20Issue%20(07-15-04).pdf. To better understand the scope of the project,
currently Walton County has 15.7 miles of critically eroded beaches of its twenty-five miles
of shoreline. See CRITICALLY ERODED BEACHES IN FLORIDA, supra note 54, at 8; see also
EMMETT R. FOSTER, DARREN L. SPURGEON, & JENNY CHENG, SHORELINE CHANGE RATE
ESTIMATES: WALTON COUNTY 3 (2000), available at ftp://ftp.dep.state.fl.us/pub/water/
beaches/ HSSD/reports/walsre.pdf.
85 Notice of Intent, supra note 84.
86 Consolidated Joint Coastal Permit and Sovereign Submerged Lands Authorization,
Permit No. 0218419-001-JC (Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. Draft 2004) [hereinafter Draft Final
Permit], available at http://bcs.dep.state.fl.us/env-prmt/walton/issued/0218419_Walton
_County%20(Feasibility%20Study,%20Taylor%20Engineering,%202003)/001-JC/Intent
%20to%20Issue%20(07-15-04)/Draft%20Final%20Permit%20(07-15-04).pdf.
87 Public Notice: State of Florida Department of Environmental Protection Consolidated
Notice of Intent to Issue Permit and Authorization to Use Sovereign Submerged Lands
(Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. 2004) [hereinafter Public Notice], available at http://bcs.dep
.state.fl.us/env-prmt/walton/issued/0218419_Walton_County%20(Feasibility%20Study,
%20Taylor%20Engineering,%202003)/001-JC/Intent%20to%20Issue%20(07-15-04)/Final
%20Public%20Notice%20(07-15-04).pdf.
88 Notice of Intent, supra note 84, at 2.
89 Id. at 3.
90 Id. at 3–4.
91 Id. at 3.
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to the project.92 In the notice of intent, the DEP noted that the current
boundary was already surveyed to be at the MHWL,93 indicating that the
draft permit’s directive to the Board to “establish the line of mean high
water . . . to establish the boundary line between sovereignty lands . . . and
the upland properties” would result in the same conclusion.94 Until the
ECL was recorded no work could proceed.95 Despite proposing to set the
ECL at the MHWL, the DEP acknowledged that due to the project’s “size,
potential effect on the environment or the public, controversial nature, or
location,” appellants might request further administrative proceedings.96
The DEP proved prescient in its prediction.97
B. The Administrative Appeal
SOB and Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. (“STBR”), a similarly-
minded citizens’ group, challenged the DEP’s draft permit in August of
2004.98 STBR also challenged the erosion control line that the Board of
Trustees established, a challenge SOB subsequently joined.99 Both parties
also filed constitutional claims, but Destin and Walton County moved to
dismiss those claims unopposed, as the groups were already challenging
the constitutionality of the BSPA in state circuit court.100 The constitu-
tional challenge had to occur separately from the administrative appeal,
because under Florida law administrative law judges (“ALJs”) may not
hear constitutional claims, being limited by the legislature to applying
state statutes.101
92 Id. at 4.
93 Id. On the survey, see SOB I, supra note 9, at 11.
94 Draft Final Permit, supra note 86, at 4. For more about setting the ECL, see supra
notes 65–75 and accompanying text.
95 Draft Final Permit, supra note 86, at 5.
96 Notice of Intent, supra note 84, at 5.
97 See generally SOB I, supra note 9; see also infra notes 101, 117.
98 See generally SOB I, supra note 9. The plaintiffs named as defendants DEP, the Board
of Trustees, the City of Destin, and Walton County, and filed their appeal before DEP
could issue its final permit. See id. at 1–3.
99 Id. at 3.
100 Id. A docket search of “Stop the Beach Renourishment” and “Save Our Beaches” reveals
a Leon County circuit court case named Tammy N. Alford v. Craig Barker, filed August 27,
2004, which includes the groups as plaintiffs. The case is currently still open, and the
plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint following the Supreme Court’s decision. A
hearing was scheduled for March 29, 2011.
101 See Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.(SOB III), 27 So. 3d 48, 54 n.3
(Fla. App. First Dist. 2006) (citation omitted).
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SOB and STBR challenged DEP’s findings regarding turbidity and
mixing zones,102 arguing that DEP erred in its calculations concerning its
proposal to dredge sand from an ebb shoal, using either a cutter head
dredge (which vacuums sand into a pipe) or a hopper dredge (which is
self-filling and then moves to the shore).103 But the ALJ decided that the
DEP sufficiently supported its finding that the project would not violate
water quality standards.104
Importantly for SOB, the ALJ determined that although sixty-two
of its 150 members had shorefront property,105 because only one landowner
testified to owning four properties in the area affected by the beach nour-
ishment project,106 SOB lacked the required associational standing under
Florida law.107 On the other hand, the ALJ decided that all of STBR’s six
members were landowners affected by the project, and therefore satisfied
standing requirements because they all owned land adjacent to the sov-
ereign submerged lands in question.108
Concerning riparian rights, based on a survey conducted in
September of 2003 the ALJ noted that the Trustees set the ECL at the
MHWL, and that construction would take place both landward and sea-
ward of that line.109 However, according to the survey, the post-construction
MHWL would be located seaward of the ECL.110 SOB and STBR claimed
that this meant that the project would affect the landowners’ right to
accretion.111 But, assuming constitutionality of the statute upon which the
ECL allocation was based, the ALJ determined that no unreasonable in-
fringement existed.112 Nor did the petitioners’ argument that they had the
right to contact the water persuade the ALJ, who considered this claim
to be the same as the right to accretions.113 Ultimately, even if the project
102 SOB I, supra note 9, at 8, 9.
103 See id. at 6.
104 Id. at 19.
105 Id. at 13.
106 Id. at 13. That landowner was one of the landowners featured in Andrew Rice’s New
York Times article, supra note 79.
107 Id. at 16–17 (citing Fla. Home Builders Ass’n v. Dep’t of Labor and Employment Sec.,
412 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1982)).
108 See SOB I, supra note 9, at 17.
109 Id. at 11.
110 Id.
111 See id. at 22.
112 Id. at 24.
113 Id. at 25. The ALJ may not have been entirely correct on this point. As explained below,
the Florida Supreme Court considered the right of contact to be subsumed within the right
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did infringe upon riparian rights, the ALJ concluded that the two groups
failed to show that the infringement was unreasonable,114 the only way
the groups could defeat such a project.115 Thus, on June 30, 2005, the
ALJ recommended that the DEP issue the permit.116 A month later, the
Secretary of the DEP issued a final order, reiterating and adopting the
ALJ’s recommendations.117
C. The Florida Court of Appeal’s Decision
SOB and STBR appealed to Florida’s First District Court of
Appeal,118 challenging the DEP’s final order and alleging that, as applied
to this project, the BSPA unconstitutionally deprived the landowners of
their riparian rights without just compensation.119 The court recognized
the ALJ’s unchallenged ruling on SOB’s lack of standing because only one
of SOB’s 150 members testified to owning land in the area.120 But the court
ruled that STBR had standing, because all of its members, though they
numbered only six, owned land in the proposed project area.121 However,
unlike the ALJ, the Florida court of appeal agreed with STBR that the
BSPA was unconstitutional as applied to the Destin and Walton County
restoration project because the court concluded that the project would
divest the landowners of their riparian rights to accretions and contact
with the water.122
Important to the court of appeal’s analysis was Florida’s historical
reliance on the MHWL to separate private property from sovereign land
and the BSPA’s alteration of that long-standing custom by fixing the
of access, not the right to accretions. See Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment,
Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1119 (Fla. 2008).
114 See SOB I, supra note 9, at 25.
115 Id.; see also FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 18-21.004(3) (2010).
116 SOB I, supra note 9, at 28–29.
117 Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (SOB II), DEP 05-0791, at 10 (Fla.
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. July 27, 2005) (final order), available at http://www.dep.state.fl.us/
legal/Final_Orders/2005/DEP05-0791.pdf.
118 Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (SOB III), 27 So. 3d 48, 54 n.3 (Fla.
App. First Dist. 2006).
119 See id. at 50. The court of appeal did not mention whether the taking was alleged to have
occurred under the United States Constitution or Florida’s constitution.
120 See id. at 55. The court reiterated and adopted, without explanation or elaboration,
the ALJ’s findings of fact on the matter. Id. at 55–56.
121 Id. at 56.
122 Id. at 58.
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boundary in the form of the ECL.123 The court ruled that by establishing
a fixed ECL that no longer guaranteed that landowners’ property lines
would be at the MHWL,124 the BSPA deprived the landowners of their
right to accretions and relictions.125 The court also disagreed with the
ALJ’s determination that the right to contact the water was the same
as the right to accretions, deciding that the BSPA eliminated that right
as well.126
Because the court of appeal concluded that the statute produced
a taking of riparian rights by eliminating the landowners’ rights to
accretions and contact, it ruled that the project infringed upon the
landowners’ riparian rights.127 Under the statute, the Board would need
to determine whether Destin and Walton County could show “satisfac-
tory evidence of sufficient upland interest” to conduct the project.128 The
court therefore remanded to the Board to determine if such an interest
existed.129 If Destin and Walton County did not acquire the necessary
property interests, eminent domain proceedings would be necessary.130
Given the importance of the constitutional issue, the court certified a
question to the Florida Supreme Court, asking whether, as applied to
the City of Destin and Walton County’s beach restoration project, the
BSPA was unconstitutional.131
123 See SOB III, 27 So. 3d. at 59.
124 The court acknowledged that none of STBR’s members’ deeds were in the record to
firmly establish exactly how far their property lines extended prior to the setting of the
ECL, but the court considered testimony regarding the property boundaries’ extension to
the high water mark to be sufficient. Id.
125 Id. On the distinction between accretions and relictions, see supra note 69. Although at
different points in the litigation courts discussed both accretions and relictions as being
in dispute, because STBR only alleged a loss of the right to future accretions, see Petition for
Writ of Certiorari 16, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130
S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (No. 08-1151), and because the Supreme Court only used the term
“accretions,” see Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S.
Ct. 2592 (2010), we refer to both accretions and relictions as simply “accretions.”
126 SOB III, 27 So. 3d at 59.
127 See id. at 60. Although the court concluded that the BSPA infringed upon the land-
owners’ riparian rights, it made no finding as to the infringement’s unreasonableness,
in keeping with the Board of Trustees’ rules. See id. Presumably, ruling the infringement
unconstitutional amounted to a finding of unreasonableness.
128 Id. at 52; see also supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
129 SOB III, 27 So. 3d at 60.
130 Id.; see also supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text. Because the Board first needed
to determine whether the governmental entities could acquire the requisite interest, the
court did not decide whether eminent domain proceedings would be necessary. SOB III,
27 So. 3d at 60 n.7.
131 Id. The full question was:
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D. The Florida Supreme Court’s Decision
The Florida Supreme Court examined the certified question by first
admonishing the court of appeal for hearing the case because a facial chal-
lenge was already pending in the circuit court.132 The supreme court also
concluded that although the court of appeal phrased the question as an as-
applied challenge, it actually decided a facial challenge, and the supreme
court rephrased the question accordingly.133 Proceeding to determine
that the BSPA was constitutional on its face, the court limited the scope
of its ruling to cases like the one in question, where the BSPA was being
used to restore critically eroded beaches.134
The Florida Supreme Court acknowledged that state courts had
yet to determine how the rights of the state and the upland owners inter-
related.135 After explaining relevant portions of the BSPA,136 the court
examined Florida’s constitutional and common law duties and powers over
land below the MHWL under the public trust doctrine.137 According to the
Has Part I of Chapter 161, Florida Statutes (2005), referred to as the
Beach and Shore Preservation Act, been unconstitutionally applied so as
to deprive the members of Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. of their
riparian rights without just compensation for the property taken, so that
the exception provided in Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21.004(3),
exempting satisfactory evidence of sufficient upland interest if the activ-
ities do not unreasonably infringe on riparian rights, does not apply?
Id. at 60–61.
132 Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1105 n.1 (2008).
See supra note 101 and accompanying text. Additionally, the Florida Supreme Court did
not specify under which constitution the statute passed muster, but instead cited to other
Florida cases for the proposition that the state cannot take littoral rights without just
compensation. Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1111.
133 Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1105.
134 Id. at 1105, 1121. Professor Donna Christie has expressed concern with the limited
nature of the court’s holding in this case. See Donna R. Christie, Of Beaches, Boundaries,
and SOBs, 25 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 19, 58–59 (2009). She interpreted the Florida
Supreme Court’s decision to be limited to situations where the state reclaims land lost
by an avulsive event, leaving open numerous future challenges based on different factual
scenarios. Id. However, a broader reading is at least arguable. Although the court stated
that “[i]n light of th[e] common law doctrine of avulsion, the provisions of the [BSPA] at
issue are facially constitutional,” Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1117, both at the begin-
ning and the end of its opinion did the court use the phrase “restoring critically eroded
beaches under the Beach and Shore Preservation Act,” without specifically mentioning
post-avulsive restoration.
135 Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1109.
136 Id. at 1107–09.
137 Id. at 1109.
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court, in conjunction with the state’s constitutional duty to “conserve and
protect Florida’s beaches as important natural resources,” the public trust
doctrine requires the state to protect its shoreline.138 With respect to up-
land owners, Florida law stipulates that they have the same rights as the
general public (bathing, fishing, navigation, and so forth), but by virtue of
their ownership of riparian land they also have rights of access, reasonable
use, accretion and reliction, and view.139 This explanation of rights differed
little from that of the court of appeal.140
But the Florida Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court’s
interpretation of the scope of the landowners’ rights, rejecting the lower
court’s interpretation that the right of access included the “independent
right of contact with the water.”141 Instead, the court viewed the contact
right as merely ancillary to the right of access, particularly because con-
tact with the water is variable, depending on the water level on any given
day.142 The supreme court also interpreted the right to accretions to be a
future contingent interest, not a vested interest; thus, the BSPA’s substitu-
tion of a fixed boundary line—the ECL—for the previously variable MHWL
merely foreclosed the possibility that these interests would become vested
in the upland owners.143
Under common law principles, littoral144 owners reaped the benefits
of accretions but also faced the risk of erosion,145 but under the BSPA the
state assumed responsibility for maintaining an upland owner’s property
line and preventing further erosion.146 Since the BSPA both protects upland
owners’ property lines and guarantees landowners’ other common law
rights, the court decided that the act effected “no material or substantial
138 Id. at 1110 (citing FLA. CONST. art. II § 7(a)).
139 Id. at 1111.
140 Compare id. with Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (SOB III), 27 So.
3d 48, 57 (Fla. App. First Dist. 2006).
141 Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1119.
142 Id. Indeed, it is possible that, due to changing tide patterns, landowners’ property lines
may not contact the water for months, or even years, particularly considering that the
MHWL relies on a nineteen-year average. See Christie, supra note 134, at 70–71; see also
supra note 65.
143 Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1112.
144 The terms “riparian” and “littoral” technically refer to distinct types of ownership in
Florida law, “riparian” meaning adjacent to rivers and streams, and “littoral” adjacent
to the ocean. But the term “riparian” has become ubiquitous in its application to both types
of parcels, and for the purposes of this Article the two terms are used interchangeably.
See SOB III, 27 So. 3d at 56–57 citing Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund
v. Sand Key Assocs. Ltd, 512 So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. 1987).
145 Walton County, 998 So. 2d at 1118.
146 Id.
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impairment of these littoral rights.”147 Further, because under Florida law
a landowner (here the state) has the right to reclaim land lost by an avul-
sion (in this case, a hurricane), the BSPA gave the state no additional
power beyond its rights under the common law.148 By striking an appro-
priate balance between the state’s duty to protect the beaches and the
private landowners’ rights, the court ruled that the BSPA was facially
constitutional.149 Thus, the state seemed to win a resounding victory. Since
the decision did not conflict with other cases, and since the case turned on
an interpretation of Florida property law, the Florida Supreme Court’s
decision appeared to settle the matter.
But the landowners filed a petition for certiorari with the U.S.
Supreme Court. Facing long odds,150 but bolstered by support from an in-
fluential libertarian property group,151 the landowners attempted to trans-
form their regulatory takings claim in the Florida courts into a judicial
takings claim in the Supreme Court.
III. THE CONCEPT OF JUDICIAL TAKINGS
A judicial taking is the idea that a court decision, no less than a
legislative or executive act, can violate the Takings Clause in the Fifth
147 Id. at 1115.
148 Id. at 1117. Professor Christie pointed out that it may seem that the state seemingly
did not have any “land” to reclaim since the state’s trust land was already submerged.
However, she argued that because under principles of avulsion the boundary between
the landowners’ parcels remains unchanged, without filling in some of the newly-
submerged land to restore the shore to where the MHWL was, the public would have no
right to use the remaining beach to access the newly submerged public lands. Christie,
supra note 134, at 49. As discussed below, this use of the doctrine of avulsion differed
from the way the Supreme Court applied the doctrine in deciding the case. See infra
note 285 and accompanying text.
149 Id. at 1115.
150 The Supreme Court’s docket has risen to over 10,000 cases per year. The Court grants
petitions for certiorari in about 100 of those cases, giving petitioners a one in one hundred,
or one percent, chance of their case being heard. The Justices’ Caseload, SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/justicecaseload.aspx (last
visited Feb. 16, 2011).
151 At the petition stage, the Pacific Legal Foundation, a self-proclaimed “limited govern-
ment and private property rights” advocacy organization, filed an amicus brief in support
of STBR’s petition. Motion for Leave to File and Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Fdn.
in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v.
Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (No. 08-1151). Subsequent to the
Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari, however, many more like-minded groups joined the
fray. See infra note 254 and accompanying text.
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Amendment.152 In the Florida beach case, in their certiorari petition the
landowners redirected attention from the state renourishment project to
the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of the effect of the project.153
They maintained that this allegedly unprecedented interpretation radi-
cally and unexpectedly changed Florida property law and, in the process,
unconstitutionally took their property.154 Four members of the Supreme
Court thought this idea was powerful enough to warrant hearing the
case,155 and a four-member plurality enthusiastically endorsed the concept.
This section explains the judicial takings concept and its slender pedigree.
The story begins with a vague mention in the late-nineteenth
century case that incorporated the Takings Clause, applying it to the
states for the first time, proceeds to a sole concurrence by Justice Stewart
in a 1960s case, and includes a dissent from denial of certiorari by Jus-
tice Scalia as well as an academic article, both from the 1990s.
A. The Beginning: Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v.
Chicago156
In 1880, the Chicago City Council passed an ordinance to widen
a street.157 Consistent with state statutes, in 1890 the city filed a petition
with the Cook County Circuit Court to condemn a right of way belonging
to the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad, to be used as a street
crossing.158 The jury, statutorily charged with deciding the proper
amount of compensation, returned a verdict of only one dollar for the
railroad.159 The railroad moved for a new trial, but was denied, and the
Illinois Supreme Court upheld the verdict.160 Before the U.S. Supreme
152 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 130 S. Ct.
2592, 2602 (2010).
153 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t
of Envtl. Protection, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (No. 08-1151).
154 Id.
155 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2597 (2010).
156 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1896).
157 Id. at 230.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 See id. Although Chicago asserted that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the Illinois
Supreme Court did not decide the case based on the U.S. Constitution, the Court deemed
it sufficient that the railroad had raised the constitutional issue below. Id. at 231–32.
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Court, the railroad argued that the judgment of one dollar deprived it of
due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.161
Deciding that it was not enough for the lower court to merely fol-
low the statutory condemnation procedure if the compensation awarded
would violate due process,162 the Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to
review the state court judgment to ensure compliance with the U.S.
Constitution.163 The Court reiterated an earlier declaration that “the
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment extend [ ] to ‘all acts of the
State, whether through its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authori-
ties.’ ”164 Although most of the Chicago Burlington opinion seemed to
suggest that the trial court violated due process by misstating the law to
the jury, in the end the Court affirmed the state court’s decision, ruling
that just compensation required only nominal compensation.165 The Court
reasoned that all the railroad was losing was the exclusivity of its right-
of-way where the city proposed a street crossing, on a parcel that “was
used, and was always likely to be used, for railroad tracks.”166 For all its
strongly-worded statements regarding applying due process of law to the
state courts, the Court affirmed the Illinois Supreme Court based on the
trial court’s jury instructions.167 It did not rule that the Illinois Supreme
Court took the railroad’s property.
161 Id. at 232–33.
162 Chicago Burlington, 166 U.S. at 234–35, 236.
163 Id. at 244. However, because the Court did not consider itself empowered to retry
the facts, it could only assess whether the trial court “prescribed any rule of law for the
guidance of the jury that was in absolute disregard of the company’s right to just compen-
sation,” emphasizing that not every state court ruling implicated the U.S. Constitution
and would be subject to federal scrutiny. Id. at 246.
164 Id. at 234 (citing Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34, 45 (1894)) (declaring that the selling of
a parcel of land made available through a probate court order whose owner was actually
still alive was a deprivation of property without due process, because the owner was never
notified of the sale). Chicago Burlington is the case that incorporated the Fifth Amendment
against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See W. David Sarratt, Judicial
Takings and the Course Pursued, 90 VA. L. REV. 1487, 1534 (2004) (also suggesting that
the Supreme Court’s holding in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), provided
a rationale for applying the Takings Clause to state courts).
165 Chicago Burlington, 166 U.S. at 258.
166 Id. at 256.
167 In dissent, Justice Brewer noted the disconnect between the majority’s discussion of the
law and its ultimate conclusion, agreeing with the majority’s statements regarding “the
potency of the Fourteenth Amendment to restrain action by a State through either its legis-
lative, executive or judicial departments,” but dissenting as to the result. Id. at 258–59
(Brewer, J., dissenting).
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B. Justice Stewart’s Concurrence in Hughes v. Washington168
During the next seven decades, the Court gave little attention to
its isolated statement in Chicago Burlington, apparently rejecting judi-
cial takings in several decisions and recognizing that state courts had the
authority to shape state law free from federal judicial intervention.169
However, in 1967, Justice Potter Stewart breathed new life into the idea
that federal courts could review state court property law decisions for fed-
eral constitutionality.170 In Hughes v. Washington, the Court reviewed a
state constitutional provision that, according to the Washington Supreme
Court, denied private landowners the right to future accretions to ocean-
front property, a right the landowners had enjoyed prior to statehood.171
The U.S. Supreme Court decided that federal law, not state law, governed
the landowner’s parcel, because the landowner’s parcel traced its title to
a federal patent, so the state’s constitutional provision could not apply,
thereby preserving the landowner’s right to accretions.172
Justice Stewart agreed with the outcome, but thought that the
Court should have addressed the validity of the state’s attempt to change
the law of accretions.173 He took issue with the majority’s idea that federal
law governed where a landowner’s title traced to a federal patent because
he thought that would mean that no state that was once a federal territory
could shape its own property law.174 Although agreeing with the notion
that states may “develop and administer” property law,175 he asserted
that in this case “state and federal questions are inextricably
168 Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
169 See, e.g., Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 680, 681 n.8 (1930)
(recognizing that “the mere fact that a state court has rendered an erroneous decision on
a question of state law, or has overruled principles or doctrines established by previous
decisions . . . does not give rise to a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment,” and that
“[t]he process of trial and error, of change of decision in order to conform with changing
ideas and conditions, is traditional with courts administering the common law.”) See also
Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364–66 (1932) (upholding
a state court’s prospective overruling of property law precedent and suggesting that retro-
spective overruling would not offend the Constitution); Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263
U.S. 444, 450 (1924) (“[T]he mere fact that the state court reversed a former decision to
the prejudice of one party does not take away his property without due process of law.”).
170 Hughes, 389 U.S. at 295 (Stewart, J., concurring).
171 Id. at 291 (majority op.).
172 See id. at 291–94.
173 Id. at 294–95 (Stewart, J., concurring).
174 Id. at 295.
175 Id.
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intertwined,” because the Washington court’s decision may have impli-
cated federal constitutional property protections.176
Thus, Justice Stewart advocated assessing the Washington
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the state constitutional provision to
determine whether it represented a “sudden change in the law, unpredict-
able in terms of the relevant precedents,” in which case “no deference would
be appropriate.”177 Examining the case law on which the Washington court
relied to conclude that its ruling was “not startling,”178 Stewart disagreed.
He found the state court’s decision to be “unforeseeable,”179 “effecting a
retroactive transformation of private into public property—without paying
for the privilege of doing so.”180 Justice Stewart grounded his conclusion
on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, opining that
the clause forbids not only state legislatures, but also state courts, from
taking property, whether intended or not.181 Although not the majority
opinion, Justice Stewart’s ideas have proved influential, at least in the
legal academy.
C. Professor Thompson’s “Judicial Takings”
In 1990, Professor Buzz Thompson published an article182 that
would become an oft-cited source for the judicial takings movement.183
Professor Thompson argued that there was no reason why courts should
not be held liable for the taking of private property under the Fifth
Amendment, and that given the Framers’ concern over cabining both
executive and judicial powers, constitutional history, in fact, supported
the premise.184 Thompson discussed Chicago Burlington, maintaining
176 Hughes, 389 U.S. at 296–97 (Stewart, J., concurring).
177 Id. at 296.
178 Id. at 297 (quoting Hughes v. State, 410 P.2d 20, 28 (Wash. 1966)).
179 Id. at 297.
180 Id. at 298.
181 Id. Cf. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, discussed infra notes 332-50 and accompanying
text.
182 Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449 (1990).
183 See, e.g., David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and
Judicial Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375, 1381 (1996) (attempting to reconcile valid uses
of the doctrine of custom with judicial uses that, in the author’s view, amount to a judicial
taking); Sarratt, supra note 164, at 1494–95 (referring to Thompson’s article as “seminal,”
but also noting that a majority of other works reject his theories). A Westlaw search reveals
over 100 items, including journals, law reviews, treatises, and briefs referencing Professor
Thompson’s article.
184 Thompson, supra note 182, at 1458–63. Justice Scalia did not agree with this view of the
738 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 35:713
that the Supreme Court recognized that the takings protections in the
Fourteenth Amendment applied to state courts through the Due Process
Clause at least since 1897.185 Although he recognized that the 1897 Court
did not discuss whether a state court’s changing of the law could effect a
taking, Thompson characterized the decision as resolving whether “the
fourteenth amendment [sic] prohibited the Illinois judiciary from awarding
one dollar in compensation for a right clearly worth far more.”186 He did
not mention that the Court affirmed that the right-of-way was worth
exactly that.187
Professor Thompson also characterized the Court’s 1980 decision
in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins188 as a “judicial takings” case,189
although he acknowledged that the Supreme Court (again) did not address
the issue.190 Despite citing these cases and a few others to support his
judicial takings theory,191 Thompson was unable to point to any definitive
source confirming that the Takings Clause applies to the courts.
Thompson separated the idea of a judicial taking into two dis-
tinct actions: first, “the decision to change current property rules in a
way that would constitute a taking,”192 and second, “the decision to
require compensation.”193 Although vague about the former,194 he 
Framers’ intent, considering it “doubtless” that the “Framers did not envision the Takings
Clause would apply to judicial action,” because “the Constitution was adopted in an era
when courts had no power to ‘change’ the common law.” Stop the Beach Renourishment,
Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2606 (2010) (plurality op.). Nevertheless,
adopting a textualist approach, Justice Scalia maintained that “what counts is not what
they envisioned but what they wrote.” Id.
185 Thompson, supra note 182, at 1463; see supra notes 156–67 and accompanying text
(discussing Chicago Burlington).
186 Id.; see also Sarratt, supra note 164, at 1503 (noting that the Chicago City Council
was responsible for the initial condemnation, and hence the court “was not dealing with
a purely judicial change in the law”).
187 See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago,166 U.S. 226, 230 (1896).
188 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
189 Thompson, supra note 182, at 1469–70.
190 Id. at 1470.
191 Id. at 1468 (citing Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967)); id. at 1469 n.85 (citing
Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973)).
192 Thompson, supra note 182, at 1515.
193 Id.
194 See id. at 1513. Thompson seemed to indicate that not all changes in property law, or
decisions concerning property rights, would produce an unconstitutional taking. See id.
at 1455 (suggesting that a judicial taking may constitute “any judicial change in property
rights that would be a taking if undertaken by the legislative or executive branch”
(emphasis in original)). Cf. id. at 1449 n.1 (noting the “cloudy” question of what a taking
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suggested that the latter presented a court with three options: 1) main-
tain the legal status quo by not changing existing law, 2) change the law
and order compensation unless the legislature overrode the decision, or
3) rule that the change in the law would take effect only if the legislature
authorized compensation within a prescribed period of time.195 Regard-
less of the option chosen, Professor Thompson contended that holding the
judiciary accountable for drastic changes in property law would “encourage
courts to be more sensitive to the impact that their decisions have on
property holders,” forcing them to “reexamine . . . the definition of prop-
erty for constitutional purposes.”196 He did not suggest that a state court
should never change property law, and he even allowed that sometimes
“a court is better equipped or situated to make the change,”197 but he did
maintain that if a court decided to change the law in such a way as to
effect an unconstitutional taking, compensation should be required.
Despite the foothold his ideas have gained in judicial takings scholar-
ship,198 until the Florida case, only a few lower courts had entertained
the notion of a judicial taking.199
comprises); id. at 1451 n.8 (recognizing the historical practice of judicial shaping of property
law but arguing that courts are accelerating the pace of their changes); id. at 1453
(accepting current jurisprudence on when legislative or executive actions effect takings);
id. at 1517 (acknowledging the premise that “[m]ost courts . . . have concluded that they do
have the authority to modify the common law, at least to meet changing circumstances and
information”); id. at 1526–27 (suggesting that the Supreme Court must embrace some nor-
mative idea of what constitutional property is, “otherwise virtually every right established
by state law could be viewed as protected by the takings provisions”).
195 Id. at 1513.
196 Id. at 1544.
197 Thompson, supra note 182, at 1514.
198 See supra note 183 and accompanying text. For Professor Thompson’s assessment of
the Florida beach case, see infra note 380.
199 See, e.g., Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468 (1985), vacated and remanded in light of
Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S.
172 (1985), 477 U.S. 902 (1986) (ruling that the Hawaii Supreme Court could not, through
changing the common law, divest rights holders of rights that had vested prior to the
change without paying just compensation). For more unsuccessful lower court attempts
to bring judicial takings claims to the Supreme Court, see Thompson, supra note 182, at
1469 n.84. See also Sarratt, supra note 164, at 1495 (describing the lower courts suggesting
judicial takings to be possible as “outliers at best”). The Court of Federal Claims’s research
in Brace v. United States revealed that Robinson was the only case to hold that “a judicial
decision that overturned prior case law could be considered a taking.” 72 Fed. Cl. 337, 359
n.35 (Fed. Cl. 2006) (rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that a court-ordered consent decree
produced a taking). Apart from Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Stop the Beach Renourish-
ment, in which he noted Thompson’s two-pronged approach to judicial takings while ex-
pressing concern about how a party would raise a judicial takings claim, see Stop the Beach
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D. Justice Scalia’s Dissent from Denial of Certiorari in Stevens v.
City of Cannon Beach:200 Resurrecting Judicial Takings
Eschewing at least one chance to take up the idea of judicial tak-
ings,201 the Court avoided the issue until 1994, when Justice Scalia (joined
by Justice O’Connor) vociferously dissented from a denial of a writ of
certiorari in Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach,202 a case challenging an
earlier decision of the Oregon Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Thornton
v. Hay.203 Given Justice Scalia’s strong opinions on the matter,204 this
1994 dissent foreshadowed the Court’s granting certiorari in Stop the
Beach Renourishment.
In Thornton, in 1969, the Oregon Supreme Court heard a challenge
to the state’s attempt to prevent a beachfront landowner from restricting
public access to its dry-sand beach.205 Although the landowners conceded
that the state owned the wet-sand area, or the area between the high and
low tides, as a “state recreation area,”206 they contested the state’s ability
to prevent them from fencing in the dry-sand area, or the area between
the high-tide line and the vegetation line, located on their property.207
The state argued that it had the right to do so, either through a preexist-
ing public easement appurtenant to the wet-sand area or through zoning
regulations enacted pursuant to state statute.208
Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2616 (2010) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring), only one other court has cited Thompson’s article, according to searches in
both Westlaw and LexisNexis. See Ultimate Sportsbar, Inc. v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 540,
549 (Fed. Cl. 2001) (declining to address the issue of a judicial taking because the plaintiffs
withdrew the argument, but not foreclosing the possibility for the future, particularly in
bankruptcy proceedings), although many appellate briefs have cited the article.
200 Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach (Stevens II), 510 U.S. 1207 (1994) (Scalia, J. dissenting
from cert. denied).
201 See Ariyoshi v. Robinson, 477 U.S. 902 (1986) (vacating and remanding for reconsid-
eration). On Ariyoshi, see supra note 199 and accompanying text.
202 See Stevens II, 510 U.S. at 1207.
203 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969).
204 See Stevens II, 510 U.S. at 1211–12.
205 Thornton, 462 P.2d at 672.
206 See id. at 672–73 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 390.720 (1967)). For the current statutory
provision referring to the land between the high and low tides as a “state recreation area,”
see OR. REV. STAT. § 390.615 (2009).
207 Thornton, 462 P.2d at 672–73. The Hays were owners of a beachfront resort and wanted
to provide exclusivity to their guests. See id. at 674.
208 Id. at 672 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 390.640 (1967), allowing the state to regulate shoreline
improvements and requiring permits for such activities).
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The Oregon Supreme Court evaluated several alternatives that
would support affirming the lower court’s finding of a public easement to
use ocean beaches in the state, including “implied dedication” and pre-
scription.209 But the court decided that those alternatives were either
unsupported by the factual record (in the case of implied dedication),210
or insufficient to prevent future litigation (in the case of prescription).211
Instead, the court ruled that within the state the public’s use rights
to the dry-sand area adjacent to the ocean were justified under the doc-
trine of custom.212 The court reasoned that the public’s use of the Oregon
ocean beaches satisfied custom’s requirements of 1) usage from antiquity,
2) uninterrupted use, 3) peaceable and undisputed use, 4) reasonable use,
5) certainty as to the area’s boundaries, 6) uniformity of application, and
7) consistency with other law.213 Further, the landowners conceded that
they knew when they bought the land that the public regularly used the
dry-sand area,214 a concession consistent with the existence of customary
rights.215 Thus, the court denied the Hays the right to fence in the dry-sand
portion of their land while simultaneously affirming the rights of the
public to all the Oregon dry-sand beaches adjacent to the ocean.216
Roughly two decades later, Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach pre-
sented a similar scenario of landowners wanting to build a seawall on
the portion of their property that was on the dry-sand beach.217 The city
denied the permit, prompting an inverse condemnation action.218 The
landowners attempted to rely on McDonald v. Halvorson,219 a 1989 case
in which the Oregon Supreme Court distinguished Thornton by denying
that custom applied to the dry-sand area of a cove beach not adjacent to
209 Thornton, 462 P.2d at 675.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 675–76.
212 Id. at 676–78.
213 Id. at 677.
214 Id. at 678 (“The public use of the disputed land in the case at bar is admitted to be
continuous for more than sixty years.”).
215 Thornton, 462 P.2d at 678.
216 Id. at 672–73. A federal district court subsequently rejected a judicial takings claim in
Hay v. Bruno, 344 F. Supp. 286, 289 (D. Or. 1972) (noting the history of public recrea-
tional beach use and state regulation dating to at least 1892). See also infra note 375 and
accompanying text for further discussion of Hay v. Bruno).
217 See Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach (Stevens II), 510 U.S. 1207, 1208 (1994) (Scalia,
J. dissenting from denial of certiorari).
218 Id.
219 780 P.2d 714 (Or. 1989).
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the ocean, and which had not been historically used by the public220 to
similarly distinguish their case.221 But the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court’s dismissal and the appellate court’s affirmance, reasoning
that, under Thornton, custom was a background principle of state law
inhering in the landowner’s title,222 and therefore the landowners could not
interfere with the public’s rights to the dry-sand area of any ocean
beaches.223 The Supreme Court denied certiorari, over a strenuous
objection by Justice Scalia, joined by Justice O’Connor.224
Justice Scalia criticized the Thornton ruling, which the Supreme
Court did not review, for its “questionable constitutionality,”225 suggesting
that the decision may have ratified a “landgrab” that “may run the entire
length of the Oregon coast.”226 Analyzing the Oregon court’s application of
the doctrine of custom to the beaches at issue,227 he maintained that the
court misunderstood the doctrine.228 Scalia asserted that a state court
could not simply declare a doctrine, like custom, to be a background prin-
ciple of state law applicable to a piece of property, referring to the Court’s
opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,229 and then use that
doctrine to “ ‘assert[ ] retroactively that the property it has taken never
existed at all.’ ”230 Justice Scalia conceded that the factual record in Stevens
was insufficient to support a Court decision whether a taking had occurred
because the trial court dismissed the claim without factual development.231
Nevertheless, he maintained that the landowners’ due process claim was
reviewable because they were not original parties to Thornton, and there-
fore they had no day in court to argue why custom should not apply to
220 Id. at 724.
221 See Stevens II, 510 U.S. at 1210.
222 Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach (Stevens I), 854 P.2d 449, 456 (Or. 1993). The
“background principle”  terminology stems from Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
in which the Supreme Court decided that if a regulation that prohibited certain uses of
land merely effectuated a “background principle[ ]” of state nuisance or property law, a
taking would not lie. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). See also
infra note 270.
223 Stevens I, 854 P.2d at 456.
224 Stevens II, 510 U.S. at 1207.
225 Id. at 1212.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id. at n.5.
229 Id. at 1211 (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031).
230 Stevens II, 520 U.S. at 1211–12 (quoting Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296–97
(1967) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
231 Id. at 1214.
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their land.232 Notwithstanding his acknowledgment that the Court could
not decide whether a taking had occurred,233 Justice Scalia endorsed the
concept of judicial takings, declaring: “No more by judicial decree than by
legislative fiat may a State transform private property into public property
without just compensation.”234
But Scalia failed to consider whether other doctrines, like prescrip-
tion, would have produced the same result in Stevens. Although the Oregon
Supreme Court in Thornton invoked the doctrine of custom to avoid reliti-
gation of the same issue for every coastal parcel,235 the trial court decided
the case on the basis of prescription, and the Oregon Supreme Court could
have upheld the ruling on that basis alone.236 Although the landowners
in Stevens attempted to distinguish their case from Thornton, their beach
was in the same city,237 hardly creating a distinct factual scenario.238
Justice Scalia also failed to discuss the peculiar facts involving the
Oregon beach in Stevens. In contrast with Florida’s beaches,239 the beaches
in Oregon were unsuited for development.240 The border between the dry-
sand area and the foreshore is constantly shifting, sometimes as much as
180 feet eastward or westward, depending on the forces affecting erosion
232 Id.
233 See id.
234 Id. at 1212 (citing Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980)).
235 See Thornton, 462 P.2d at 676–77 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*75–78).
236 See id. at 673, 676 (discussing the trial court’s ruling that the public acquired an ease-
ment over the dry-sand area); see also id. at 676 (“[W]e conclude that the law in Oregon,
regardless of the generalizations that may apply elsewhere, does not preclude the creation
of prescriptive easements in beach land for public use.”).
237 Stevens II, 510 U.S. at 1210.
238 Justice Scalia was not the only one to overlook this fact. Oregonians in Action (“OIA”),
a group focused on limiting regulatory imposition on private land, filed an amicus brief
in Stop the Beach Renourishment in which it criticized the Oregon Supreme Court’s
“creative[ ]” application of custom in Thornton and suggested that “various groups with
the focus and goal of organizing and funding lobbying and litigation” were partially to
blame (without acknowledging its own status as just such a group). Brief of Oregonians
in Action Legal Center as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Petitioner at 16–17, Stop the
Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010)
(No. 08-1151). OIA did not recognize the possibility that the landowners in both Thornton
and Stevens would likely have lost their cases on grounds other than custom. See id.
239 See, e.g., text following supra note 79.
240 Thornton, 462 P.2d at 674 (describing the dry-sand area as “unstable in its seaward
boundaries, unsafe during winter storms, and for the most part unfit for the construction
of permanent structures”).
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and accretion.241 Consequently, Oregon beaches largely remained as
they were at statehood. The public enjoyed unquestioned use of the unde-
veloped beaches, and both the dry and wet sand areas were open to all.242
Not until many decades later did upland landowners begin to attempt to
exploit the development potential of the Oregon beaches.243 As a result,
the 1967 Oregon legislature declared the preservation of the public’s
rights in the beaches to be state policy.244 Thus, the real novelty in Thorn-
ton was the prospect of allowing unprecedented development on Oregon’s
beaches, not affirming the public’s customary rights to use them.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S FLORIDA BEACH DECISION
Some fifteen years after Justice Scalia’s dissent in Stevens, the
Florida beach case presented an opportunity to revisit the judicial takings
issue, but only after the landowners recast their claim from a regulatory
taking to a judicial taking in their petition for certiorari.245 That the Court
would grant certiorari under such circumstances is a measure of how en-
thusiastically at least four of the Justices viewed the prospect of a viable
judicial takings doctrine. Or perhaps how persuasive Justice Scalia is to
some of his colleagues. Or perhaps both.246
A. The STBR Petition for Certiorari
STBR first unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the Florida
Supreme Court to rehear the case.247 The group then filed a petition for
a writ of certiorari on March 13, 2009, supported by a brief from the
Pacific Legal Foundation.248 Instead of claiming that the statute was
241 Id.
242 Id. at 673 (noting the public use of the beaches for such activities as clam-digging,
building fires for cooking, and general recreation).
243 See id. at 674 (describing the recognition of a lack of potential building locations on the
Oregon beach as having “[r]ecently . . . attracted substantial private investments in
resort facilities”).
244 Id. at 674 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 390.610 (1967)).
245 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 125, at (i).
246 It is also possible that the Pacific Legal Foundation’s support of the certiorari petition,
supra note 151, was influential.
247 Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2008),
reh’g denied Dec. 18, 2008.
248 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 125; Motion for Leave to File and Brief of
Pacific Legal Fdn. as Amicus Curiae, supra note 151.
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unconstitutional as applied to its case, STBR now argued that the
Florida Supreme Court’s opinion, by approving the BSPA, took their
property.249 The petitioners claimed that the state court had unconstitu-
tionally interpreted legislation to both eliminate littoral rights and
replace them with inadequate statutory rights,250 while allowing an agency
to “unilaterally modify a private landowner’s property boundary without
a judicial hearing or payment of just compensation.”251 Although the
petitioners had raised no such “judicial takings” claim in the proceedings
below,252 and there were no conflicting decisions in the lower courts, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari June 15, 2009.253
The case attracted the attention of several additional libertarian
property rights groups on the side of STBR.254 Several non-profit organiza-
tions and numerous governmental bodies, including states, counties, cities,
and the federal government, supported the state DEP.255 The amici on the
249 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 125, at (i).
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 18, Stop the
Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010)
(No. 08-1151).
253 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 129 S. Ct. 2592. That the Supreme Court would take
a case raising entirely new arguments without any grounding in existing law reflects the
activism of the Court.
254 In all, seventeen groups, either jointly or alone, filed amici briefs in support of STBR,
including the Owners’ Counsel of America, the National Association of Home Builders, the
Florida Home Builders Association, the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, Citizens
for Constitutional Property Rights Legal Foundation, Inc., the Eagle Forum Education
& Legal Defense Fund, the New Jersey Land Title Association, Save Our Shoreline, the
American Civil Rights Union, Save Our Beaches, the Southeastern Legal Foundation, the
Coalition for Property Rights, Inc., the New England Legal Foundation, the Cato Institute,
Inc., the NFIB Legal Center, the Pacific Legal Foundation, and the Oregonians in Action
Legal Center. Proceedings and Orders: Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. Petitioner v.
Florida Department of Environmental Protection, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/08-1151.htm (last visited
Feb. 17, 2011).
255 On the DEP’s side were the United States, the Surfrider Foundation, the states of
California, Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio,
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington,
West Virginia, Wyoming, the American Planning Association, the Florida Chapter of the
American Planning Association, the Florida Shore and Preservation Association, the
Florida Association of Counties, the Florida League of Cities, the National Association of
Counties, the National League of Cities, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the International
City/County Management Association, the International Municipal Lawyers Association,
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side of STBR exhorted the Supreme Court to recognize judicial takings as
a viable doctrine to limit the state’s ability to alter private property rights,
many asserting that the Framers of the Constitution intended the Takings
Clause to apply to all branches of government, not just the legislative
and executive.256
On the other hand, the amici supporting the state DEP reminded
the Court of its previous deference to state courts’ decisions concerning
the definition of property rights.257 For example, the amicus brief of the
United States succinctly stated: “This Court should not recognize a ‘judicial
takings’ claim in this case because, at bottom, the action complained of
was not that of a court.”258
the Coastal States Organization, and Brevard County. Id.
256 See, e.g., Brief of Cato Inst., et al., as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12, Stop
the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (No. 08-1151); see generally Brief of the Eagle
Forum Educ. & Legal Def. Fund as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Petitioner, Stop the
Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (No. 08-1151) (discussing the history of the Takings
Clause and arguing for its application to all branches of government). However, several
briefs for the other side contested that historical reading. See Brief of the Am. Planning
Ass’n and the Fla. Chapter of the Am. Planning Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 13, Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (No. 08-1151); Brief
for the States of California, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 5, Stop the
Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (No. 08-1151). Further, one brief raised the history
of common law property reform in the nineteenth century and the abolition of such
anachronistic rules as coverture and primogeniture, neither of which were challenged on
the premise that the courts ratifying the changes effected takings. Brief of the Nat’l Ass’n
of Counties, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 8–9, Stop the Beach
Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (No. 08-1151).
257 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Am. Planning Ass’n, supra note 256, at 6. The American
Planning Association’s brief also drew a distinction between a state law that takes property
and a court’s definition of a property interest, maintaining that the Supreme Court decides
the former types of cases but declines to hear the latter. Id. at 7, 10–11, 28–29. In par-
ticular, the brief emphasized Sauer v. City of New York, 206 U.S. 536, 549 (1907), in which
the Court declared that it “has neither the right nor the duty . . . to reduce the law of the
various states to a uniform rule which it shall announce and impose.” Brief of the Am.
Planning Ass’n as Amicus Curiae, supra note 256, at 7. According to the Court, “[s]urely
such questions [of state law] must be for the final determination of the state court.” Sauer,
206 U.S. at 548.
258 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 18, Stop the
Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (No. 08-1151). Then-Solicitor General and now
Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan signed the brief for the United States as Counsel
of Record. Id. at cover. The federal government’s brief highlighted the fact that during the
entire process of the litigation before reaching the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs had been
arguing a “conventional takings claim.” Id. at 18. The federal brief argued that the peti-
tioners were merely asserting that the Florida Supreme Court made the wrong decision,
not that it effected a taking. Id.
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Surprisingly, even though he had participated in earlier proceedings,
Justice Stevens was absent at the oral argument on December 2, 2009.259
His absence was due to his ownership of a condominium near a Florida
beach,260 an absence that would materially affect the case’s outcome.261
At oral argument, the remaining eight Justices wasted little time
questioning the advocates about the case. The attorney for STBR hardly
managed an introduction before Justice Ginsburg asked why in the pro-
ceedings below STBR argued that the state statute produced a taking,
but now before the Supreme Court it urged a judicial taking.262 Justice
Scalia raised the question of construing the beach nourishment project
as an avulsion instead of an accretion from the outset, foreshadowing his
ensuing opinion.263 The arguments eventually digressed into conjecture
concerning hot dog stands on the beach,264 spring break beach parties,265
and “port-a-johns,”266 as the Justices grappled with Florida property law
and the lack of definitive precedent. Due to the scattered arguments rais-
ing hypothetical factual issues and rarely-discussed doctrines of Florida
259 Richard Lazarus, The Logic of High Court Decisions, THE ENVTL. FORUM, March/April
2010, at 14, available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/lazarus/docs/columns/
ELIColumnMarApr2010.PDF.
260 Id.
261 See infra notes 352-56 and accompanying text. Not all of the Justices felt compelled to
recuse themselves despite potentially conflicting interests: for example, Justice Scalia’s
family owns beachfront property in the Outer Banks, North Carolina, an area that has
experienced its own struggle between private landowners and the public. Joan Biskupic,
Fla. Property Case No Day at the Beach for Supreme Court, USA TODAY (Dec. 3, 2009),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-12-02-florida-property-rights_N.htm.
Justice Scalia declined to comment on the issue. Id. Chief Justice Roberts owns waterfront
property in Maine. Nina Totenberg, High Court Weighs Florida Beach Case, NATIONAL
PUBLIC RADIO, Dec. 2, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1210
30772.
262 Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. 2592
(No. 08-1151).
263 Id. at 6. Justice Scalia stated that he thought two avulsions actually occurred in the case:
the first when the hurricane eroded the shoreline, the second when the state replenished
it. Id. at 6–7. Although counsel for the petitioners argued that no Florida law supported the
idea that the state could respond to the hurricane’s avulsion with an artificial avulsive
event of its own, id. at 7, ultimately the Court declared that although “perhaps state-
created avulsions ought to be treated differently . . . nothing in prior Florida law makes
such a distinction,” meaning that the Florida Supreme Court did not change the existing
precedent. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2612 (2010) (majority op.).
264 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 262, at 9.
265 Id. at 39.
266 Id. at 46.
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law, the argument concluded without providing much of a hint as to how
the Court would decide the case.
B. The Supreme Court’s Opinions
The Supreme Court issued its opinion towards the end of its term,
on June 17, 2010.267 Somewhat surprisingly, the easiest issue for the Court
was whether a taking had occurred. The answer was a resounding “no,”
with all eight Justices in agreement.268 Considerably more contentious
was the question of whether the question of a judicial taking should be
reached in a case that involved no taking. Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion
addressed the issue in detail at the outset and gave the concept a ringing
endorsement,269 perhaps predictable given his longstanding interest in the
issue.270 Justice Scalia undertook a lengthy exposition of why the Takings
Clause should apply to courts,271 but he was unable to muster enough votes
to write a majority opinion. However, neither the concurring nor the dis-
senting opinions squarely rejected the concept of a judicial taking,272 thus
leaving the issue very much in play.
1. 8-0: No Taking Under Florida Law for an Avulsive Event
Ironically, with respect to the element of the case most important
to the petitioners—whether the beach nourishment project produced a
taking—the Supreme Court quickly assessed Florida property law and
disposed of the issue, concluding that no taking occurred.273 Although the
267 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2592.
268 All eight Justices joined in Parts I, IV, and V of the opinion, but only a plurality joined
Justice Scalia in Parts II and III. Id. at 2597. Consequently, when this Article refers to “the
Court” it is referencing either Parts I, IV, or V, and when it refers to “the plurality” it is
referencing either Parts II or III.
269 Id. at 2596.
270 See supra notes 225-34 and accompanying text; see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, 1031, 1032 n.18 (1992) (positing that while the question of background prin-
ciples is one of state law, ultimately a state court’s interpretation of its law will be subject
to federal court review to determine whether it is “an objectively reasonable application
of relevant precedents” (emphasis in original)).
271 See infra notes 291–328 and accompanying text.
272 See infra notes 331–33 and accompanying text.
273 Rick E. Rayl, Supreme Court Issues Decision in Florida Beach Takings Case, CAL.
EMINENT DOMAIN REPORT (June 17, 2010), http://www.californiaeminentdomainreport
.com/2010/06/articles/court-decisions/supreme-court-issues-decision-in-florida-beach
-takings-case/.
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Florida Supreme Court had focused on the BSPA and its effects on pri-
vate property rights,274 Justice Scalia relied on more fundamental tenets
of state law such as the state’s right, as sovereign owner of the submerged
land in question, to fill trust land, provided the fill does not interfere with
the rights of littoral property owners or the rights of the public.275 Equally
important, according to the Court, was the principle that the owner of the
submerged land, in this case the state, retained title to any land exposed
by an avulsive event.276
STBR grounded its Supreme Court argument on the claim that
the Florida Supreme Court deprived the landowners of both their right
to accretions and their right to contact with the water.277 The Court dis-
missed these concerns without lengthy discussion, noting that to prevail
the petitioner would have to “show that, before the Florida Supreme Court’s
decision, littoral-property owners had rights to future accretions and con-
tact with the water superior to the State’s right to fill in its submerged
land,”278 which the Court found too high a bar to overcome.279
The Court adopted the Florida Supreme Court’s decision that the
right to accretions “was not implicated by the beach-restoration project,
because the doctrine of avulsion applied.”280 Interestingly, although the
state court considered the avulsive event in question to be a hurricane’s
washing away dry land,281 and ruled that the state had the right to re-
store the land the avulsion destroyed,282 the Supreme Court considered
the state’s creation of dry land through beach nourishment as the kind
of rapid change that also constituted an avulsion.283 Either way, because
the Court interpreted Florida law to favor the state’s right to fill over a
riparian landowner’s right to future accretions, the opinion observed that
the petitioner’s allegation was not grounded in a right “established under
Florida law.”284 Citing different Florida authority than the Florida Supreme
274 See supra notes 143–49 and accompanying text.
275 Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2611
(2010).
276 Id. (citing Bryant v. Peppe, 238 So. 2d 836, 837, 838–39 (Fla. 1970)).
277 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 125, at 17–18, 21–23.
278 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2611.
279 Id.
280 Id. at 2612.
281 Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1116 (Fla. 2008).
282 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
283 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2611.
284 Id. at 2611–12. Although the Court also noted that the state’s right to fill was only
superior to the extent that it “does not interfere with the rights of the public and the rights
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Court relied upon on its decision, but nonetheless upholding the Florida
court’s opinion, the Supreme Court recognized the State’s right to fill its
submerged lands through avulsion.285 Since the Court uncovered no con-
clusive distinction in Florida law between natural (e.g., hurricane-induced)
and artificial (e.g., state-created) avulsions, it could not conclude that the
Florida court erred.286
With respect to the right to contact the water, STBR was similarly
unable to convince the Court that the scant evidence of such a right in
Florida case law287 was sufficient to overcome Florida’s superior rights
under the law of avulsion.288 The Court concluded that the Florida court
could reject the notion that riparian owners had a perpetual right for their
uplands to abut the MHWL, since STBR relied solely on dicta in one case
that hardly established the right.289 Because the Court concluded that the
Florida Supreme Court’s interpretations were “consistent with [ ] back-
of littoral landowners,” id. at 2611, the Court did not explicitly decide that no interference
occurred. Indeed, its statement that the landowners’ property “has been deprived of its
character (and value) as oceanfront property” due to the state’s action indicated the oppo-
site. Id. at 2612. However, it is also possible that the Court simply did not consider worth
mentioning the BSPA’s benefits to the landowners, including preserving the rights of access
and view free of structures, rights not necessarily preserved under Florida common law
avulsions. See Christie, supra note 134, at 61–62. The Court did note that STBR’s criticisms
regarding the BSPA’s replacing common law rights with statutory rights were unfounded,
because the source of the right does not matter “so long as the property owner continues
to have what he previously had.” Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2613, n.12.
285 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2613 (citing Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274
(Fla. 1927)) (deciding that the state retained ownership to land that was once part of a lake
when the state itself drained the water, and that the doctrine of accretion did not apply).
Professor Christie made a similar argument in her article on the Florida Supreme Court’s
decision, maintaining that the BSPA may have been intended to reflect the existing common
law of avulsion, and so “[f]inding that beach restoration . . . is avulsion is a straightforward
way of applying common law principles to carry out the intent of the legislature to continue
state ownership of the land created seaward of [the] ECL.” See Christie, supra note 134,
at 60.
286 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2611–12.
287 The petitioner relied almost exclusively on dicta in the Sand Key decision to support its
argument. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2612–13. See also Bd. of Tr. of the
Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., 512 So.2d 934, 936, 940 (Fla. 1987)
(mentioning as included within riparian rights “the right of access to the water, including
the right to have the property’s contact with the water remain intact,” but ruling on the
narrow issue of whether a statute reserving to the state the title to accreted lands created
by a beach renourishment project applied to private landowners who did not participate
in the project, and deciding that it did not).
288 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2612–13.
289 Id. (citing Sand Key, 512 So.2d 934, 936 (Fla. 1987)); see supra note 287.
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ground principles of state property law,” it could not rule that a taking
had occurred.290
2. Justice Scalia’s Plurality: Endorsing Judicial Takings
Perhaps because the issue of whether a taking had actually occurred
was not a close decision, Justice Scalia devoted the bulk of the plurality
opinion to a hypothetical judicial taking.291 The absence of context enabled
Scalia to write what was essentially an advisory opinion, devoting sub-
stantial effort to describing what the Court would do had it decided the
Florida Supreme Court’s opinion effected a taking.292 In this academic
exercise, Justice Scalia endeavored to give judicial sanction to the concept
of judicial takings, resting his argument primarily on the absence of any
specific precedent to the contrary and thirty-year-old dicta in two cases
in which the Supreme Court neither confirmed nor denied that a judicial
taking was possible.293
First, the plurality stated that the Takings Clause “is not addressed
to the action of a specific branch or branches,”294 citing PruneYard Shopping
Center v. Robins295 as a case “arguably suggest[ing] that the same [takings]
analysis applicable to taking by constitutional provision would apply” to
judicial action.296 But nowhere in PruneYard did the Court attempt to apply
290 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2612. The Florida Supreme Court was
essentially deciding a matter of first impression, applying existing law to new factual
circumstances. See Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d
1102, 1109 (Fla. 2008) (noting the relative paucity of case law detailing the relationship
between public and private beachfront property rights). For example, whereas STBR was
claiming a vested right to future accretions, the majority of prior Florida law concerned
already-accreted land. See Christie, supra note 134, at 70–71 (discussing the lack of case
law on future accretions and the sparse mention of the right to contact with the water in
Florida case law).
291 See generally Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2601–2610 (plurality op.).
292 Id.
293 Although Justice Scalia cited Chicago Burlington for the proposition that “the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits uncompensated takings,” id. at
2603, he did not refer to that case to support his theory of judicial takings. This approach
differed from that of Professor Thompson, who argued that Chicago Burlington was the
foundation of the judicial takings doctrine. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
294 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2601 (plurality op.). Justice Scalia’s textual
approach here was quite similar to his concurrence in Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct.
876, 929 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[t]he [First] Amendment is written in terms of
‘speech,’ not speakers . . . [and] offers no foothold for excluding any category of speaker.”).
295 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
296 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2602 (plurality op.).
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the takings analysis to judicial decisions. Its sole sentence mentioning
“judicial reconstruction of a State’s laws of private property”297 was a refer-
ence to the appellants’ contentions, not the Court’s own understanding of
the case.298 Further, although Justice Scalia characterized the PruneYard
Court as “treat[ing] the California Supreme Court’s application of the con-
stitutional provisions as a regulation,”299 what the Court actually did was
analogize the California Constitution’s free speech provision to a statute
solely for the purpose of obtaining federal jurisdiction.300 Justice Scalia
acknowledged that the Court in PruneYard did not actually decide the case
on the issue of whether the California Supreme Court produced a taking,
but he was convinced that the opinion “certainly does not suggest that a
taking by judicial action cannot occur . . . .”301
Second, Scalia relied on Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v.
Beckwith,302 as a case allegedly “even closer in point.”303 In Webb’s, the
Florida Supreme Court interpreted two Florida statutes to allow the
clerk of a county court to both assess a fee for holding money in an inter-
pleader account and to take the interest accruing on the account.304 The
U.S. Supreme Court described its task as deciding “whether the second
exaction by Seminole County amounted to a ‘taking,’ ”305 not whether the
Florida Supreme Court’s decision produced the taking. In a fact-specific,
limited holding, the Court determined that there was no justification for
the interest charge since the county had alternate means of being compen-
sated for holding the funds.306 Justice Scalia accurately quoted the case
as saying that “[n]either the Florida Legislature by statute, nor the
Florida courts by judicial decree, may accomplish the result the county
seeks simply by recharacterizing the principal as ‘public money . . . .’ ”307
However, read in context, the Court was referring to the state statute’s
297 PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 79.
298 Id.
299 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2602 (plurality op.).
300 PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 79. The statute under which the Court granted jurisdiction
allows the Court to hear cases from the highest state court “where the validity of a statute
of any State is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution.”
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2006).
301 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2602 (plurality op.).
302 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
303 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2602 (plurality op.).
304 Webb’s, 449 U.S. at 159–60.
305 Id. at 160.
306 Id. at 164.
307 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2602 (quoting Webb’s, 449 U.S. at 164).
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effect, not to the Florida Supreme Court’s decision.308 These two cases,
then, while not explicitly rejecting the notion that a court decision could
effect an unconstitutional taking, hardly comprise a ringing endorsement
of the proposition.
With respect to how a judicial takings claim would reach the court,
the plurality was terse at best. Brushing off Justice Kennedy’s concern over
“when the claim of a judicial taking must be asserted,”309 the plurality
opined that if a party thought a lower state court produced a taking, it
would first appeal to the state supreme court, then to the U.S. Supreme
Court if it was still not satisfied; if denied certiorari, the state supreme
court’s decision would become res judicata.310 The plurality did not stop
there, however. Instead, it proceeded to state that even persons not parties
to the original suit could claim a taking by challenging a state supreme
court decision in federal court, seemingly unconcerned with the prospect
of unleashing a flood of litigation.311
The plurality next attempted to devise a test that a federal court
would use to determine whether a state court effected a taking, as it was
not entirely in agreement with the respondents’ proffers.312 First, Justice
Scalia considered the state’s suggestion of requiring a state court’s deci-
sion to have a “fair and substantial basis” in state law313 to be essentially
the same as whether the state court eliminated an “established property
right.”314 However, he distinguished between a wholesale elimination of
a property right and a situation where a court would “clarify and elaborate
property entitlements that were previously unclear,”315 the latter not
necessarily rising to the level of unconstitutionality.316 The plurality also
criticized the state’s argument that federal courts “lack the knowledge of
308 See Webb’s, 449 U.S. at 164.
309 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2607 (plurality op.); id. at 2616–17
(concurring op. of Kennedy, J.); see also infra notes 346–50 and accompanying text.
310 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2609–10 (plurality op.).
311 Id.
312 Id. at 2610.
313 Id. at 2608; see also Brief for Respondents Walton County and City of Destin 30–31,
Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (No. 08-1151) (presuming that “fair
support” was the correct standard of review) (citations omitted).
314 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2608 (plurality op.).
315 Id. at 2609. Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court undertook just such a clarification. See
Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So.2d 1102, 1109, 1111 (Fla.
2008) (noting the lack of detail and explanation in prior Florida law concerning riparian
rights).
316 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2609 (plurality op.).
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state law required to decide” whether a judicial taking occurred.317 Justice
Scalia responded that without “the power to decide what property rights
exist under state law,” federal courts would not be able to enforce the
Takings Clause at all,318 a statement that may fuel the fire of advocates
wishing to have federal courts become the final arbiters of state prop-
erty law.319
The plurality also rejected the landowners’ proffered test suggesting
that a federal court could look to the “unpredictability” of the state court’s
decision, in keeping with Justice Stewart’s opinion in Hughes v. Wash-
ington,320 because the plurality considered a decision’s predictability to
have little bearing on its constitutionality.321 Instead, the plurality again
turned to whether an “established property right[ ]” had been elimi-
nated.322 Under this test, to ascertain whether a judicial taking had
occurred, a court would need to 1) determine that a property right was
“established” under state law, and 2) decide that the state court’s deci-
sion “eliminat[ed]” that right.323 This focus on the elimination of an
established property right, rather than Justice Stewart’s emphasis on
unforeseeable changes,324 would appear to equip federal courts with wide
berth to overrule changes in state property law. If a court were to deter-
mine that such an established property right was eliminated, the plurality
seemed to tacitly adopt Professor Thompson’s idea of remanding the invali-
dated law to the legislature,325 which would then either have to compensate
the private property owner or acknowledge the invalidity of the state court’s
application of the law.326
317 Id.
318 Id. The entire quote reads: “A constitutional provision that forbids the uncompensated
taking of property is quite simply insusceptible of enforcement by federal courts unless they
have the power to decide what property rights exit under state law.” Id.
319 Perhaps because the plurality opinion does not have the force of law, see infra notes
351–56 and accompanying text, Justice Scalia felt entitled to paint with a broad brush. This
lack of precision is certain to provide fodder for future federal-state property law disputes.
320 See supra notes 173–81 and accompanying text.
321 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2610 (plurality op.).
322 Id.
323 See id. at 2610–11.
324 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
325 See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
326 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2607 (plurality op.) (maintaining that
if the Court were to decide that the Florida Supreme Court’s application of the BSPA
effected a taking, the legislature “could either provide compensation or acquiesce in the
invalidity of the offending features of the Act”).
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Although Justice Scalia convinced three other Justices to join him
in recognizing a sweeping new doctrine resting on scant judicial prece-
dent,327 he could not construct a majority. Further, by neither adopting
the parties’ tests for a judicial taking nor endorsing Justice Stewart’s lan-
guage in Hughes concerning “sudden” or “unpredictable” changes in state
law,328 the plurality veered off into uncharted territory, authorizing federal
courts to overrule state court interpretations of state property law by sub-
stituting federal court judgments concerning state law. This is a startling
authorization for federal courts to reshape federal-state juridical relations.
3. The Breyer and Kennedy Concurrences: Dodging the Question
Justice Breyer, in a brief concurring opinion in which Justice
Ginsburg joined, agreed that no taking had occurred in the case, but
questioned the need to address the question of judicial takings at all.329
Breyer expressed concern at the plurality’s willingness to “invite a host
of federal takings claims” without setting some limits on federal courts’
authority to reinterpret state property law.330 Although not expressly
disavowing the idea of judicial takings, Breyer thought that addressing
the issue was wholly unnecessary to decide the case.331
In contrast, Justice Kennedy, somewhat surprisingly joined by
Justice Sotomayor,332 while concurring that no taking occurred and agree-
ing with Justice Breyer that the Court need not reach the issue of a judicial
327 For example, Justice Scalia justified the plurality opinion by stating that “this Court
has had no trouble deciding matters of much greater moment, contrary to congressional
desire or the legislated desires of most of the States, with no special competence except
the authority we possess to enforce the Constitution,” although he declined to provide
examples. Id. at 2605.
328 See supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text. Professor Sarratt, an advocate of the
judicial takings doctrine, preferred adopting Justice Stewart’s Hughes approach as well.
See Sarratt, supra note 164, at 1530. Focusing on whether the state court upset reasonable
expectations, Sarratt suggested, would be more “workable” than forcing a federal court
to substitute its own conceptions of property rights for the state’s. Id. at 1532.
329 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2618 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he
plurality unnecessarily addresses questions of constitutional law that are better left for
another day.”).
330 Id. at 2618–19. The full quote reads, “if we were to express our views on these questions,
we would invite a host of federal takings claims without the mature consideration of
potential procedural or substantive legal principles that might limit federal interference
in matters that are primarily the subject of state law.” Id.
331 Id. at 2619.
332 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2613 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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taking,333 suggested a different vehicle to hold a state court accountable for
its decisions concerning private property—invoking the Due Process
Clause.334 Justice Kennedy interpreted the Takings Clause to be properly
limited to the executive and legislative branches, the “political” branches
that are accountable for the way in which they manage the public fisc.335
A major problem Justice Kennedy saw with applying the Takings
Clause to judicial decisions was the idea that, so long as the court ordered
compensation for private landowners, a state court could eliminate property
rights, which he considered to be an attempt to create a constitutional
means to effect an inherently unconstitutional end.336 He believed that
there was no authority for the notion that a court has the power to
“eliminate established property rights by judicial decision” in the first
place.337 But the Due Process Clause, according to Kennedy, provides an
established way to constrain judicial overreach,338 as it allows higher
courts to review lower court rulings without having to address thorny
issues of compensation and proper procedure.339
Justice Kennedy was unsure that the Constitution’s Framers
understood the Takings Clause to apply to the judiciary, since only the
legislature had eminent domain authority.340 Indeed, Justice Kennedy did
not see the judicial branch as the proper governmental body to be making
policy decisions about what property rights should and should not exist.341
Although he recognized that the Court had expanded the application of
the Takings Clause beyond the Framers’ likely intent,342 he cautioned the
333 Id. at 2613, 2615.
334 Id. at 2614. Justice Kennedy has often invoked the Due Process Clause when confronted
with potential governmental overreach. See Michael C. Blumm & Sherry L. Bosse, Justice
Kennedy and the Environment: Property, States’ Rights, and a Present Search for Nexus,
82 WASH. L. REV. 667, 691–92, 709–10, 723 (2007) (providing examples of Justice Kennedy
applying the Due Process Clause, often in lieu of the Takings Clause, in the contexts of
retroactive legislation and governmental regulation).
335 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2613 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
336 Id. at 2614 (“If the Court were to hold that a judicial taking exists, it would presuppose
that a judicial decision eliminating established property rights is ‘otherwise constitutional’
so long as the State compensates the aggrieved property owners.” (citation omitted)).
337 Id.
338 Id. (calling the Due Process Clause “a central limitation upon the exercise of judicial
power”).
339 Id. at 2616–17.
340 Id. at 2616.
341 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2614–15, 2616 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
342 Justice Kennedy indicated that the Framers’ most likely intended the Takings Clause
to apply “only to physical appropriation pursuant to the power of eminent domain.” Id. at
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Court to take care not to adopt a doctrine that could be “inconsistent with
historical practice.”343
Procedural and remedial questions also troubled Justice Kennedy.344
Thus, he argued that the Court should take up the question of judicial tak-
ings in the future only if absolutely necessary.345 The plurality’s cursory
explanation of how a judicial takings claim could be raised did not convince
Kennedy. He observed that, under the plurality’s approach,346 a state court
could “determine the substance of state property law” in one case, and
then the original plaintiff could file a separate lawsuit alleging a taking,
since the second lawsuit would not be barred by res judicata, as the issue
had not been litigated.347 Under this two-case model, Justice Kennedy
worried that a court would be able to order only just compensation, with-
out the option of invalidating the previous decision.348 Even if one case
decided all the issues, and the highest court reversed the taking, the court
effecting the taking would still, according to Kennedy, be liable for a
temporary taking.349 Given the difficulties of these issues and presented
with a factual scenario that made addressing them completely unnecessary,
2614 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028
n.15 (1991)). He also noted that the legislature was the traditional branch making the
appropriations decisions. Id. Justice Scalia retorted in the plurality opinion that the intent
of the Framers was not relevant, since “the Constitution was adopted in an era in which
the courts had no power to ‘change’ common law.”Id. at 2606 (citing Blackstone, as well as
his dissent in Rodgers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 472-78 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
However, well before the Constitution was adopted common law courts invented the Rule
Against Perpetuities to mediate between the desires of landed testators, who sought to per-
petuate dead-hand control, and the concerns of grantees, who wanted alienable property
rights. The signature case was the Duke of Norfolk’s Case, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch. 1681),
a seventeenth century decision. See JESSE DUKEMINIER, PROPERTY, 285 (7th Ed., 2010);
George L. Haskins, Extending the Grasp of the Dead Hand: Reflections on the Origin of
the Rule Against Perpetuities, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 19 (1977).
343 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2616.
344 Id. at 2616–17.
345 Id. at 2618 (“If and when future cases show that the usual principles, including consti-
tutional principles that constrain the judiciary like due process, are somehow inadequate to
protect property owners, then the question whether a judicial decision can effect a taking
would be properly presented.”).
346 See supra notes 309–11 and accompanying text.
347 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2617. Justice Kennedy expressed doubt
that “parties would raise a judicial takings claim on appeal, or in a petition for writ of
certiorari,” in the first case, because the issue was not previously litigated. Id. But that
is exactly what happened in the Florida beach case.
348 Id.
349 Id.
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Justice Kennedy considered the Due Process Clause adequate to protect
private property owners from errant judicial decisions until a change in cir-
cumstances made deciding the question of judicial takings unavoidable.350
V. THE LEGACY
Like Rapanos v. United States,351 Stop the Beach Renourishment
is a case without a majority opinion on the issue of judicial takings. The
only part of the case to obtain a majority of votes was the part that ruled
that no taking occurred.352 Thus, the decision will have binding effect only
on the parties to the suit353—further reason to question why the Court
heard the case. Unlike the opinions in Rapanos,354 the Justices did not
address which opinion controlled, but in such a situation the lower courts
are bound only by the “position taken by those Members who concurred
in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .”355 It would then seem
that Justice Breyer’s opinion should govern, since he would not have taken
up the idea of judicial takings at all,356 leaving the question of judicial
takings for another case. Nonetheless, some lower federal courts may
rely on Justice Scalia’s opinion and declare state court opinions to have
effected takings.
A. Ratifying Beach Nourishment Projects, For Now
The immediate and most visible effect of the Court’s decision is that
the Florida Department of Environmental Protection may continue to issue
350 Id. at 2618.
351 547 U.S. 715, 718 (2006) (vacating a lower court decision concerning the scope of the
Clean Water Act’s jurisdiction over navigable waters without producing a majority as to
which navigability test to apply).
352 See supra notes 273-90 and accompanying text.
353 One court has already noted the lack of precedential weight of the plurality opinion.
See Sagarin v. City of Bloomington, 932 NE 2d 739, 745 n.2 (Ind. App. 2010) (rejecting
the appellant’s argument that, under Stop the Beach Renourishment, other remedies
exist for inverse condemnation besides compensation because, according to the court, the
plurality opinion is “without precedential authority”).
354 See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (suggesting that Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence supplied the rule of decision); id. at 810 n.14 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) (noting the likelihood that “Kennedy’s approach will be controlling in most cases”).
355 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
356 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2618–19 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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permits for beach restoration, setting ECLs, and filling trust lands.357 Other
states with beach restoration programs may similarly proceed in their
efforts to reclaim property lost to the waves.358 For example, in a case
argued the same day as Stop the Beach Renourishment, the New Jersey
Supreme Court unanimously ruled that a landowner did not acquire title
to beachfront land created by a nourishment project, and therefore could
not be compensated in an eminent domain proceeding because the state’s
common law doctrine of avulsion allowed the state to make its submerged
public trust land dry land.359
357 See generally Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (majority op.).
358 For some states, however, the effect may not quite be the same. For example, in Texas
and North Carolina, the doctrine of avulsion is of questionable use with respect to coastal
waters. See Christie, supra note 134, at 27 n.48. In Texas, the state supreme court recently
decided that an avulsive event cannot encumber private property with a public easement
where no such easement previously existed. Severance v. Patterson, 2010 WL 4371438 at
*1, *54. Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 172 (Tex. Nov. 5, 2010), reh’g granted (Mar. 11, 2011). In Severance,
the state argued that a public easement could “roll” from one parcel to another when the
originally-encumbered parcel became submerged. Id. After Hurricane Rita essentially
wiped out the property that was subject to the easement, Severance’s land was left seaward
of the new vegetation line. See id. at *2.
When the state attempted to enforce a public easement on Severance’s now ocean-front
property under the Texas Open Beaches Act, a statute which prevents private landowners
from obstructing public access to beaches encumbered by a public easement, Severance
sued the state alleging a taking. Id. at *2, *6. Quoting Stop the Beach Renourishment for
the proposition that “[t]he Takings Clause only protects property rights as they are estab-
lished under state law, not as they might have been established or ought to have been
established,” the Texas Supreme Court found no background principles in Texas law that
provided an independent basis for public ownership or use of beachfront property. Id. at
*2–4 (quoting Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2612 (majority op.)). Absent
proof of a reservation or an easement of some kind, no public rights existed in Texas’ dry
sand area. Id. Recognizing that Texas courts had never applied the doctrine of avulsion to
“upset” the mean high tide line, the court ruled that in Texas an easement for the public
use of privately-owned land cannot move when the original land burdened becomes sub-
merged. Id. at *9-10. To the extent that contrary cases existed in Texas law, the Texas
Supreme Court disapproved of them. Id. at *15. Because the court was answering ques-
tions certified to it by the federal Fifth Circuit, it did not decide the merits of the plaintiff’s
claim. However, in practical terms, the case means that, for now, at least one Texas beach
restoration project is on hold. See Harvey Rice, State Calls off Big Galveston Beach Project,
HOUS. CHRON. (Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/business/realestate/
7295713.html (citing Severance as having effectively halted the project, because state law
prohibits the use of public funds for the benefit of private property).
359 City of Long Branch v. Jui Lung Yiu, et al., 4 A.3d 542, 551-52 (N.J. 2010). Possibly
anticipating a petition for certiorari alleging a judicial taking, the New Jersey court
stressed that “[i]n deciding this case, we therefore rely on traditional common-law prin-
ciples.” Id. at 553.
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Whether continuation of beach renourishment projects will bene-
fit the environment is hardly clear. In light of the prospect of rising sea
levels and increasingly intense storm events, continuing to dredge sand
from the bottom of the ocean and dump it onshore may prove to be a fool’s
errand. More importantly, state courts must apparently find ways of using
existing principles of state property law to justify such programs, and they
may decide to apply their law quite narrowly in order to avoid the risk of
a landowner challenge in federal court.360
Even if STBR had prevailed in the case, its members would have
gained very little. After the Florida District Court of Appeal decided Save
Our Beaches,361 the Florida legislature amended the BSPA, stipulating
that if any claimant alleged a taking in response to a beach renourish-
ment project, the reviewing court must take into consideration the added
value a landowner would obtain through the project and offset it against
the damage done to the rest of the property.362 In this case, any “damage”
done to the STBR members’ remaining upland property would almost
certainly be offset by the increased value provided by the renourishment
project.363 Further, if the state were not to assert ownership of sand that
was publicly-financed and built on publicly-owned trust land, the result
would grant a windfall to private landowners.364 Given the generally
uncontroversial nature of beach restoration programs until this case,365
and with no split among the state courts or the federal circuits on the
issue, coupled with the fact that these plaintiffs had hardly anything to
gain economically from prevailing in the case, the Supreme Court’s grant
of certiorari is astonishing.
360 See supra text accompanying note 311.
361 See supra notes 127–30 and accompanying text.
362 FLA. STAT. § 161.141 (2010); see also Christie, supra note 134, at 57–58.
363 Smith, supra note 80 (quoting a Florida Atlantic University economist as saying “[w]hen
you renourish, the value of the land goes up”). For example, on Captiva Island, one of
Florida’s barrier islands on the Gulf Coast, property values increased by five times their
original value in the decades following a 1980s nourishment project. Id.
364 Bd. of Tr. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., 512 So. 2d
934, 946–47 (Fla. 1987) (Ehrlich, J., dissenting) (“The giving away of [sovereign] lands
is not only not authorized by our Constitution, it is wrong, wrong, wrong.”). Cf. Brief for
Respondents Walton County and City of Destin, supra note 313, at 48 (emphasizing that
“[t]he property petitioner says has been taken was created by the government on land
owned by the government with funding provided by the government,” so STBR’s members
did not “lose” rights to any land that was rightfully theirs). The Board of Trustees may sell
trust land or authorize private use, but may only do so when consistent with the public
interest. FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 11. The Florida Constitution does not contemplate giving
away public land. See id.
365 See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text.
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B. Disrupting the Federal-State Relationship
One of the potentially most significant ramifications of the plural-
ity’s activism may be its effect on the dynamic between the federal and
state judiciaries. In the words of Professor Frank Michelman, “giving
federal judges the last word on questions of the meaning of laws emanat-
ing from state authorities . . . seems to be a gross contravention of Our
Federalism.”366 The current Court has not demonstrated the deference to
the principles of federalism that the Rehnquist Court did,367 and it has
begun to accelerate the pace at which it allows the federal government to
encroach into state territory, an example being the recent decision incor-
porating the Second Amendment against the states.368
By asserting that federal courts have the power to reinterpret state
property law, Justice Scalia and the plurality would have effectively re-
versed the historic practice of allowing the highest state courts to determine
their state’s law.369 Federal courts would therefore not only have the power
366 Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas
and Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 305 (1993–94): “Our Federalism”
refers to three principles Justice Black outlined: 1) keeping the lines between state and
federal law clear, 2) ensuring that the federal courts respect the role of the state courts,
and 3) maintaining a position of judicial restraint within the federal judiciary. Id. at
302–03. See also Williamson B. C. Chang, Unraveling Robinson v. Ariyoshi: Can Courts
“Take” Property?, 2 U. HAW. L. REV. 57, 58 (1979) (arguing that allowing district courts
to review state court decisions concerning state property law, as Robinson v. Ariyoshi
suggested, could “completely reorder our system of federalism”).
367 Liptak, supra note 2 (“Federalism has less salience with this court than it did with the
Rehnquist court.” (quoting Sri Srinivasan)).
368 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). Justice Stevens alluded to the
growing federal involvement in state law in his McDonald dissent, quoting Justice Scalia’s
statement in Stop the Beach Renourishment that “[g]enerally speaking, state law defines
property interests,” to argue that the Chicago gun ordinance the Court struck down was
“unexceptional” as an exercise of state property law. Id. at 3109 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2597 (2010) (op. of Scalia, J.)).
This criticism of increasing federal oversight indicates how pivotal Justice Stevens could
have been in defeating the idea of judicial takings.
369 See, e.g., Sauer, 206 U.S. 536, 546, 549 (1907) (recognizing that the United States
Supreme Court “is not made, by the laws passed in pursuance of the Constitution, a court
of appeal from the highest courts of the states, except to a very limited extent,” and citing
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 264 (1821), for
the proposition that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to “correct any supposed errors
of the state courts in the determination of the state law”). The Sauer Court decided that the
New York Court of Appeals, not the United States Supreme Court, had the right to deter-
mine what easements existed appurtenant to a piece of property under New York law.
Id. at 548; see also supra note 257 and accompanying text.
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to decide state property law, but they would also have to become fluent in
the law of each state.370 And by outlining such a permissive approach for
bringing a judicial takings claim—in which the original party could appeal
a state’s highest court’s decision to the Supreme Court, or a non-party could
collaterally attack the decision later in federal court371—the plurality
seemed to have opened the floodgates to scores of takings claims chal-
lenging state court decisions that clarify state property law and adapt it
to new circumstances and social needs.372
370 At oral argument, Justice Kennedy did not seem pleased with the prospect of the Court
“hav[ing] to become real experts in Florida law.” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note
262, at 24.
371 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2609 (plurality op.). The plurality’s
assertion that adopting the judicial takings doctrine would not violate the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, id. at 22–23, may suggest that these four Justices will begin voting to grant more
petitions for certiorari, since the Supreme Court would necessarily become the court of last
resort. (The Rooker-Feldman doctrine stands for the proposition that only the Supreme
Court can review final state court judgments. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413,
415–16 (1923); Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983).)
Further, under the plurality opinion’s sanctioning of collateral attacks, lower federal courts
should likewise prepare for a deluge of judicial takings litigation.
However, at least one federal circuit judge has expressed doubt that a lower federal
court would be a proper forum for a judicial takings claim. See Bettendorf v. St. Croix
County, 631 F.3d 421, 435 n.5 (7th Cir. 2011) (Hamilton, J. concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (expressing the view that a judicial takings claim “could be brought to the
Supreme Court but probably not to lower federal courts” (citing Stop the Beach Renourish-
ment, 130 S. Ct. at 2602, 2609)). But this view overlooks Justice Scalia’s apparent distinction
between an original party’s ability to challenge a state supreme court decision at the
Supreme Court and a subsequent party’s ability “to challenge in federal court the taking
effected by the state supreme-court opinion.” Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at
2609–10 (emphasis added).
372 For example, the Cato Institute, which also filed a brief in support of the landowners
in Stop the Beach Renourishment, supra note 254, filed a brief in support of a certiorari
petition in PPL Montana, LLC v. State of Montana, arguing that the Montana Supreme
Court effected a judicial taking by deciding that the beds of certain rivers were navigable,
thus vesting title of the beds in the state. Brief for the Montana Farm Bureau Federation
and the Cato Institute as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner 15, PPL Montana, LLC v.
Montana, 79 U.S.L.W. 3102 (U.S. Aug. 12, 2010) (No. 10-218). The Cato brief claimed that
the Montana Supreme Court disregarded the federal test for navigability and created its
own test, thus unsettling property expectations that had existed for a century. Id. at 15-16.
In PPL Montana, the Montana Supreme Court ruled that the Clark Fork, Missouri,
and Madison Rivers were navigable at statehood for purposes of state ownership of the
riverbeds. 229 P.3d 421, 443, 2010 MT 64, ¶¶ 78–79, 355 Mont. 402 (Mont. 2010). The court
considered the federal navigability test to be “very broadly construed,” relying primarily
on whether a river was capable of being used for commerce at the time of statehood. Id.
at 446-47, 2010 MT ¶¶ 99–100. Under this broad interpretation, the court decided that
present-day conditions of a river could assist in making a determination of navigability
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Take the doctrine of customary rights governing Oregon beaches,
for example. Given Justice Scalia’s vigorous dissent from the denial of cer-
tiorari in Stevens,373 he may have seen in the Florida beach case a vehicle
to encourage a collateral attack on the public property rights recognized
by the Oregon Supreme Court.374 At least in the case of Thornton, however,
and upheld the trial court`s determination that the rivers were navigable. Id., 2010 MT
¶¶ 100–101. Thus, the beds of the rivers belonged to the state since statehood under the
Equal Footing Doctrine. Id., 2010 MT ¶ 110.
Although the court disagreed with the trial court’s determination that the beds were
school trust lands for whose use compensation was required, it decided that, since the lands
were in fact public trust lands, the state legislature could require compensation for their
use. Id. at 450, 460, 2010 MT ¶¶ 116, 117, 170. The court noted that its decision was limited
to the facts of the case, and that its determination that the rivers were navigable and thus
subject to the public trust doctrine did not necessarily mean that every use of the riverbeds
would subject a user to a state fee. Id. at 460, 2010 MT ¶ 170. On November 1, 2010, the
U.S. Supreme Court invited the Acting Solicitor General “to file a brief in th[e] case express-
ing the views of the United States,” perhaps reflecting the importance of the case to the
Court. Supreme Court of the United States, Docket No. 10-218, http://www.supremecourt
.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/10-218.htm.
The Cato Institute also filed a brief in support of landowners in Maunalua Bay Beach
Ohana 28 v. Hawaii, 222 P.3d 441 (Haw. Ct. App. 2009), cert. denied, 2010 WL 2329366
(Haw. June 9, 2010), and cert. denied, ___ S. Ct. ____, 79 U.S.L.W. 3141 (U.S. Nov. 1, 2010)
(No. 10-331), 2010 WL 3525699, a case in which the landowners alleged that a state statute
prescribing rules for accretions took their property rights to both future accretions and
unregistered previously accreted lands, by placing them in the conservation district. Id.
at 443. The trial court found for the landowners, concluding that the statute, which
prevented the building of structures even on registered accreted lands unless previously
eroded, unconstitutionally took their rights to both existing and future accreted land. Id.
The appeals court affirmed that the statute was unconstitutional with respect to the
existing accretions, but ruled that it was constitutional as to the future accretions. The
court noted that any right to future accretions was “purely speculative,” and that no vested
right to them existed under Hawaii law. Id. at 460. As to existing accreted land, the court
acknowledged that the statute took unregistered accreted land by declaring it to be state
property. Id. at 462. But because the landowners failed to allege what specific tracts of land
had been taken, the appeals court remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Id.
at 464.
The Cato Institute’s Supreme Court brief questioned Hawaii’s ability to “extinguish”
the right to future accretions in light of “this Court’s recognition of littoral rights as unquali-
fiedly vested property interests,” asserting that, “[e]ven in the wake of this Court’s decision
in Stop the Beach Renourishment . . . the answer is far from clear.” Brief Amicus Curiae
of Pacific Legal Foundation and the Cato Institute in Support of Petitioners 3, Maunalua
Bay Beach Ohana 28 v. Hawaii, 79 U.S.L.W. 3141 (U.S. Sept. 7, 2010) (No. 10-331).
373 See supra notes 210–32 and accompanying text.
374 Indeed, one of the amicus briefs supporting the petitioners seemed more focused on the
Oregon case than the Florida case. See Brief of Oregonians in Action Legal Center as
Amicus Curiae Supporting the Petitioner, supra note 238, at 1 (expressing in its statement
of interest the group’s belief that “its experience with takings jurisprudence in Oregon
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it is unlikely that the original plaintiffs would desire to become involved
in the case once again since they were already unsuccessful in bringing
a takings challenge in federal court shortly after the Oregon Supreme
Court’s decision.375 Consequently, a new party would need to take up the
cause and attempt to collaterally attack the decades-old Thornton
decision. At the outset, the idea that someone not a party to the original
suit could challenge a prior state court decision as a taking in federal court
presents a host of difficulties for a reviewing court.376 As Justice Scalia
can be helpful to this Court in formulating its decision”). The brief’s final section was
entirely devoted to Oregon law. Id. at 16–21. Following the Supreme Court’s Florida
beach decision, at least two Oregon attorneys indicated the possibility of resurrecting
Thornton. Edward Sullivan & Carrie Richter, Florida Homeowners Cannot Stop the
Beach Renourishment, DAILY J. OF COMMERCE, July 9, 2010, http://djcoregon.com/news/
2010/07/09/florida-homeowners-cannotstop-the-beach-renourishment/ (“with Stop the
Beach, there may now be an avenue to have federal courts look at this issue anew”).
375 Hay v. Bruno, 344 F. Supp. 286, 290 (D. Or. 1972) (dismissing the Hays’ claim that
enforcing the state statute recognizing public rights in the dry sand area amounted to a
taking). Applying Justice Stewart’s language from Hughes, supra notes 177–81 and accom-
panying text, the court noted that “there was no sudden change in either the law or the
policy of the State of Oregon” and “[t]here was no unpredictable result.” Hay, 344 F. Supp.
at 289; see also supra note 216.
376 Some state court property law decisions would be nearly impossible for federal courts to
take up. For example, the Washington Supreme Court recently decided that a landowner
who built a house entirely on the adjacent landowner’s property due to a faulty survey did
not have to abate the encroachment, but instead could pay the adjacent landowner for the
value of the land encroached upon. Proctor v. Huntington, 238 P.3d 1117, 1118 (Wash.
2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. ___, 79 U.S.L.W. (Mar. 21, 2011). Upholding the trial court,
the Washington Supreme Court recognized “the evolution of property law in Washington
away from rigid adherence to an injunction rule and toward a more reasoned, flexible
approach.” Id. at 1123. Four justices dissented, and the dissenting opinion characterized
the majority opinion as a “judicial taking,” id. at 1125 (Sanders, J., dissenting), and as an
exercise in “judicial eminent domain,” id. at 1129, perhaps inviting the Supreme Court to
take up the case. In Proctor’s petition to the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, the
statement of the case reads as follows: “The Washington Supreme Court upheld a judicial
taking forcing the transfer of private property from one party to another in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari
3, Proctor v. Huntington, 2011 WL 381116 (U.S. Feb. 1, 2011) (No. 10-996). Instead of
grounding the petition on Justice Scalia’s analysis of judicial takings in Stop the Beach
Renourishment, the petition focuses on Washington property law, id. at 8–16, and takings
jurisprudence  in general, id. at 16–20. In fact, the petition does not cite Stop the Beach
Renourishment once, possibly indicating that the use of the phrase “judicial taking” was
meant more to attract the Court’s attention than to put forth a substantive argument on
the issue.
According to Justice Scalia’s reasoning, even if the landowner decided not to pursue an
appeal, another landowner could challenge the court’s ruling in federal court. Questions
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acknowledged in his Stevens dissent, the lack of a factual record is trou-
bling.377 Further, as Justice Kennedy noted, the remedy a later court
could provide is unclear.378 Would the reviewing court invalidate the
earlier decision, or would it simply order compensation?379 These un-
answered questions may have kept Justice Kennedy from endorsing the
judicial takings doctrine.
Although the adoption of judicial takings only received four votes,
with Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in which Justice Sotomayor joined,
at least six Justices seem to have endorsed some form of restraint on—or
federal review of—state property law opinions.380 Thus, the plurality opin-
ion is not the only authority a federal court could rely on to justify its
interpreting state property law.381
of ripeness and standing aside, the case, like Stop the Beach Renourishment, highlights
the gradual evolution of state property law in keeping with evolving values, here valuing
the substantial improvements made to the land, (i.e., an entire house built on the basis
of a good faith mistake), over one particular acre in a large tract of land. See generally
JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 141 (7th ed. 2010) (noting the drift away from a
“rather harsh” rule requiring an “innocent improver” to remove any improvement built on
another’s land toward allowing the improver to buy the land or the adjacent landowner to
buy the improvement).
377 Stevens II, 510 U.S. 1207, 1207 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
378 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2617 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
379 See id.
380 See id. at 2597, 2613. When Professor Thompson recently critiqued the case, he
similarly concluded that “a majority of the sitting Supreme Court justices have publicly
concluded that the United States Constitution constrains the ability of state courts to
eliminate or significantly modify at least some established economic rights.” Barton H.
Thompson, Judicial Takings Redux: Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Department
of Environmental Protection 2, The 13th Annual Conference on Litigating Takings and
Other Legal Challenges to Land Use and Environmental Regulation (Nov. 5, 2010),
available at http://www.vermontlaw.edu/Documents/2010TakingsConference/20101104
_Thompson.pdf. However, in Professor Thompson’s opinion, because the Court set such
a high bar for invalidating state court decisions, “[t]hose who worry about an activist court
applying Constitutional provisions to restrain state court decision making on property
issues probably can stop worrying.” Id. at 6.
381 Cf. Gibson v. Am. Cyanamid, No. 07-C-864, 2010 WL 3062145, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 2,
2010) (interpreting Kennedy’s concurrence as endorsing the proposition that “judicial de-
velopment of the common law . . . can violate the constitution [sic]”). The Cato Institute’s
Brief supporting certiorari in PPL Montana, supra note 372, asserted that both Scalia’s
plurality opinion and Kennedy’s concurrence led to the same result: that “state judges
cannot do by decree what state legislatures cannot do by fiat.” Brief for the Montana Farm
Bureau Federation and the Cato Institute, supra note 372, at 17 (citation omitted).
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C. Judicial Takings: A Doctrine With a Shaky Foundation
Perhaps the most astonishing aspect of the Florida case was the
plurality’s rush to ratify the judicial takings doctrine in the absence of
any concrete facts. Justice Kennedy cautioned against expanding the
application of the Takings Clause, noting that the Court has already ex-
panded it “beyond the Framers’ understanding” by applying it to regula-
tory actions.382 Justice Scalia similarly acknowledged a lack of original
intent to subject regulations to scrutiny under the Takings Clause.383 But
at least regulatory takings have some relation to the legislative and execu-
tive branches’ eminent domain authority.384 In contrast, by ascribing to the
judiciary the power to “take” property under the meaning of the Takings
Clause, the plurality would further attenuate the clause from the Framers’
original intent.385
A better approach to aberrant judicial decisionmaking might well
be Justice Kennedy’s suggestion of employing the Due Process Clause.386
Because the remedy for a violation of due process would be injunctive
382 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2616 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (referring to
the application of the Takings Clause to “regulations that are not physical appropriations”).
383 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 n.15 (1992) (asserting that “the
text of the Clause can be read to encompass regulatory as well as physical deprivations,”
while acknowledging that “early constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause
embraced regulations of property at all”).
384 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2616 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Professor
John Echeverria, who wrote The American Planning Association’s amicus brief in support
of the government, supra note 256, has suggested five reasons why the Takings Clause
should not apply to the judiciary: 1) the judiciary has no eminent domain authority, 2) the
rationale that takings liability constrains the majoritarian leanings of the political branches
does not translate to the courts, 3) judicial takings would undermine federal-state relations,
4) state courts’ institutional structure assures a strong fidelity to constitutional values, and
5) judicial interpretation of property rights tend to apply broadly rather than single out
particular landowners. John A. Echeverria, Stop the Beach Renourishment: Why the
Judiciary Is Different, 35 VT. L. REV. 475, 487-93 (2010).
385 See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and
the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 782 (1995) (asserting that the Takings Clause
as originally intended applied only to actual physical appropriations of property, not to
regulations limiting property’s use); William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original
Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694,
708 (1985) (describing James Madison’s intent that the Fifth Amendment apply “only to
the federal government and only to physical takings,” while serving as “a statement of
national commitment to the preservation of property rights”).
386 U.S. CONST., AMEND. 5, 14.
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relief, a reviewing court could avoid valuing compensation.387 The Court
could also rely on the “fair or substantial support” test the respondents’
amici suggested, which would better respect federalism concerns by simply
assessing whether the state court’s decision “was consciously designed
to ‘evade’ or ‘subvert’ a federal constitutional right.”388 Or the Court could
have adopted the test for judicial takings that Justice Stewart advanced in
Hughes.389 That test, by attempting to discern whether a decision effected
a “sudden” or “unpredictable” change in state law,390 seems more respect-
ful of state court decisionmaking than the test the plurality endorsed.391
Instead, the plurality’s preferred mechanism would equip federal courts
with far-reaching authority to investigate and redirect state property
law. Given the available alternatives for addressing judicial overreach at
the state level,392 the plurality’s rush to adopt the judicial takings doctrine
in the Florida beach case is baffling.
CONCLUSION
The plurality’s recognition of judicial takings may stifle the evolu-
tion of common law property, an evolution that has been taking place for
centuries, and which has allowed property law to reflect contemporary
387 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2614 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see
also Roderick E. Walston, The Constitution and Property: Due Process, Regulatory Takings,
and Judicial Takings, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 379, 435–36 (2001) (describing the application
of the Due Process Clause to judicial decisions).
388 See Brief of the Am. Planning Assoc. as Amicus Curiae supra note 256, at 31–34 (quoting
Fox River Paper Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 274 U.S. 651, 655 (1927), discussing Supreme Court
precedent for the “fair or substantial support” test).
389 See supra notes 177–81 and accompanying text. It is worth noting that in Hughes Justice
Stewart objected to the application of federal law because he thought that such a result
would deprive states of the ability to shape their property law. See supra note 174 and
accompanying text.
390 Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
391 See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
supra note 258, at 22–29 (analyzing the Florida Supreme Court’s decision under the
Hughes test and concluding that the court did not depart from existing law); Brief for
Respondents Walton County and City of Destin, supra note 313, at 32–39 (arguing that
the Florida Supreme Court did not alter Florida law in a significant way); Respondent
Florida Department of Environmental Protection’s Brief in Opposition at 11, Stop the Beach
Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (No. 08-1151) (“[T]he decision neither reverses prior
precedent nor marks an unpredictable and sudden change in state law.”). The plurality
seemed dismissive of the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of Florida property law.
See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 285.
392 See, e.g., supra notes 338–42 and accompanying text.
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values.393 Justice Kennedy, who is so often determinative,394 did not rule
out the possibility of adopting a judicial takings doctrine in the future.395
But Kennedy also has expressed concern that states should be able to
respond to changing conditions with new regulations, and he believes
that the Takings Clause does not demand a “static body of state property
law.”396 In fact, he made this argument in the unique context of coastal
property.397 Even Justice Scalia has acknowledged that the law must adapt
to new situations, recognizing that “changed circumstances or new knowl-
edge may make what was previously permissible no longer so.”398 Neverthe-
less, the plurality opinion may effectively restrict state courts’ ability to
adjust their property law out of the apprehension that a federal court will
strike down their interpretation of state law.399 When the U.S. Supreme
393 Cf. Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background
Principles As Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 336–39 (2005)
(describing the evolution of nuisance background principles in light of changing environ-
mental concerns); ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE 121 (2003) (“To argue that
change [to common law property rules] is always wrong . . . is to call into question both the
history of the institution and the legal mechanisms that have kept landowner rights in
line with shifting values and circumstances for centuries.”); id. at 259 (asserting that to
hamper the evolution of property law would “sever property’s link to the culture that it
serves,” and that “a static property regime would inevitably become an anachronism and
would gradually be perceived as an obstacle to progress”).
394 See Blumm & Bosse, supra note 334, at 669–70 (noting that advocates before the Supreme
Court often tailor their arguments to Justice Kennedy since his vote is often pivotal).
395 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2613 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
396 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment).
397 Id.
398 Id. at 1031 (majority op.). Cf. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2609 (plural-
ity op.) (recognizing that courts “clarify and elaborate property entitlements that were
previously unclear”); Brief of the Am. Planning Assoc. as Amicus Curiae, supra note 256,
at 4–11 (surveying the history of federal court deference to state court decisions regard-
ing state law and arguing that although federal law can govern whether a taking has
occurred, it cannot decide how to define the property interest at issue).
399 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2619 (Breyer, J., concurring). Professor
Ben Barros has suggested that the Court should distinguish between so-called private-
public transfers (e.g., the Oregon beach case, where the public’s customary rights trumped
the landowner’s right to exclude) and so-called private-private transfers (e.g., a change in
the rules of adverse possession concerning boundary disputes favoring one landowner over
another). See Ben Barros, PROPERTY PROF BLOG (Sept. 1–8, 2010), http://lawprofessors
.typepad.com/property/takings (providing a number of examples of each type of transfer).
See also Benjamin Barros, The Complexities of Judicial Takings, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. ___
(forthcoming, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1699355 (last visited Feb. 28,
2011). Although Barros was not explicit about the purpose of such a distinction, presumably
applying judicial takings only to private-public transfers would allow state courts to
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Court decides to review a state supreme court’s reversal of an isolated
decision by a state court of appeal on an obscure topic of state littoral
rights law, other state courts are likely to take notice.
One thing seems evident: a substantial segment of the Roberts
Court is willing to venture into uncharted waters like judicial takings,400
even in the absence of factual context and over objections that adopting
such a doctrine would permit federal court intrusions into matters tradi-
tionally left to state courts.401 Although Justice Scalia’s plurality was one
continue at least some of their historic function of adjusting property law to reflect
contemporary values.
But the distinction is problematic for several reasons. First, the assumption seems
to be that state courts need the discipline of federal court oversight through the Takings
Clause because they will otherwise favor public over private rights. However, public choice
theory suggests that favoring the unorganized public is unlikely. See PHILLIP P. FRICKEY
& DANIEL A. FARBER, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991).
Moreover, American law has long been suspicious of private-private transfers. See, e.g.,
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (Chase, J.) (suggesting that “a law that takes
property from A, and gives it to B” is a violation of natural law). And the text of the
Takings Clause requires a public use. U.S. CONST. amend. V. So, if a distinction is to be
drawn, the private-private transfers would be more, not less likely to be subject to judicial
takings, or perhaps to due process limits. (Barros does suggest that private-private
transfers would be subject to due process review.).
Second, so-called private-public transfers would likely be the product of governmental
regulation. But of course subjecting regulation to takings claims is inconsistent with the
Framers‘ intent, as even Justice Scalia has acknowledged. See supra notes 342, 383, 385
and accompanying text. Expanding the application of the Takings Clause to include
federal court review of state court interpretations of state regulations seems at least one
bridge too far.
Third, Barros’ position that private-public transfers should be subject to judicial
takings review is problematic because the state created the property rights in the first
instance and might reasonably readjust those rights in the interest of the community. See
Charles River Bridge Co. v. Warren Bridge Co., 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 548 (1837) (“While the
rights of private property are sacredly guarded, we must not forget that the community
also have rights . . . .”); Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 84-85 (1851) (“We
think it is a settled principle, growing out of the nature of a well ordered civil society, that
every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under
the implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated, that it shall not be injurious to
the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor
injurious to the rights of the community. All property in this commonwealth . . . is derived
directly or indirectly from the government . . . .”) Absent singling out certain landowners
for disparate treatment, see Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9
CONST. COMMENT. 279, 307 (1992), the Takings Clause appears unnecessary to discipline
government regulators or state judges interpreting state law.
400 See id. at 2618 (noting the plurality unnecessarily addresses the question of judicial
taking).
401 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 258,
at 12 (urging the Court to be cautious before taking the “extraordinary step” of ruling that
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vote short of a majority in the Florida beach case,402 and although the
newest member of the Court, Justice Elena Kagan, signed the federal brief
in support of the state,403 the judicial takings doctrine now appears to be
in play. Whether this development will retard the evolution of state prop-
erty law to meet the challenges that will be imposed by climate change, sea
level rise, and increased catastrophic storm events remains to be seen. But
with several decades likely left in the tenure of Chief Justice Roberts,404
state property law may become no more stable than the Florida beaches.
a state supreme court can effect a taking); Brief for Respondents Walton County and City
of Destin, supra note 313, at 27–29 (outlining several reasons “why opening the door to
federal court review of state interpretations of state property law would be undesirable”);
Brief for the State of California, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra
note 256, at 5 (cautioning against adopting STBR’s proffered rule because it “would not
only authorize federal judicial review of state real property law decisions but also a wide
range of other state court decisions interpreting state laws”).
402 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2597 (noting four of nine justices who
signed onto the plurality opinion).
403 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 258, at 13–14 (noting the
lack of historical support for applying the Takings Clause (or, to use the brief’s terminology,
the “Just Compensation Clause”) to the judiciary).
404 See Liptak, supra note 2 (noting that Chief Justice Roberts is only 55 years old).
